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ARTICLES
TORTS WITHOUT NAMES, NEW TORTS,
AND THE FUTURE OF LIABILITY FOR
INTANGIBLE HARM
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM * AND G. EDWARD WHITE **
Torts have names for a reason. A tort without a name would very nearly be
a contradiction in terms because it would not describe itself. But torts do not
always get names immediately upon birth. Typically, it takes some time to
recognize what they are because they are in search of an identity or have vaguely
defined content. The law of torts of the future may well experience this process,
as it works through the rights and liabilities that govern harms characteristic of
the information age: invasions and misuses of digitized personal data and
sexualized attitudes and misconduct, for example. The dominant form that new
liabilities took in the twentieth century was through the establishment of new,
particularized torts. An alternative, but much less known form of liability,
however, competed with the named-tort approach during this same period and
to some extent, still competes with it. This is the application of what we call a
“residual category” of liability. In our judgment, however, a residual category
approach to the intangible harms of the twenty-first century should and would
fail in the same way, and for the same reasons, that this approach largely failed
in the twentieth century. The new torts of the twenty-first century will have to
be particular, named torts. This Article explains why this will be the case, and
then undertakes to demonstrate how these explanations apply to the most salient
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forms of intangible harm on the current scene—harms that inevitably will be
candidates for tort liability in the years to come. We identify the aspects of each
form of loss that we think may well become actionable through the adoption of
new torts or the expansion of existing torts, as well as the aspects of loss that will
continue not to be actionable.
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INTRODUCTION
Torts have names for a reason. The names “invasion of privacy,”
“intentional infliction of emotional distress” (“IIED”), and even
“negligence” each are descriptions of the core content of these
different causes of action. The same is true of all the other torts. A
tort without a name would very nearly be a contradiction in terms
because it would not describe itself. But torts do not always get names
immediately upon birth. Typically, it takes some time to recognize
what they are because they are in search of an identity or have a vaguely
defined content. This was at first true for IIED 1 and the privacy torts, 2
the last new intentional torts to be adopted, about a century ago.3 And new
torts sounding in negligence have largely camouflaged this process through
the combined force of doctrinal structure and misdirected emphasis.4
Because not a single, named new tort has been adopted in nearly a
century, it might appear that the process by which new tort liabilities
1. See, e.g., Nickerson v. Hodges, 84 So. 37, 37–39 (La. 1920) (holding the
defendants liable for intentionally inflicting emotional distress via a cruel practical
joke, without naming the basis or cause of action); Lamson v. Great N. Ry. Co., 130
N.W. 945, 945–46 (Minn. 1911) (affirming a judgment holding a railroad conductor
liable for affecting the plaintiff’s health by using strong language in her presence).
2. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 68–69, 81 (Ga. 1905)
(holding that the petition set forth a cause of action for violating a person’s privacy
when a publishing company published a likeness of the plaintiff without the plaintiff’s
consent); Rhodes v. Graham, 37 S.W.2d 46, 46–47 (Ky. 1931) (reversing the trial
court’s decision granting the defendant’s demurrer in an action for wiretapping
plaintiff’s telephone conversations, with no reference to what would later be termed
the tort of “intrusion on seclusion”).
3. See generally WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 54–67, 1050–
62 (1941) (describing the emergence of IIED and privacy tort actions).
4. The default rule that there is no liability in negligence without the existence
of a predicate duty means that new negligence torts often are created by recognizing
a new duty not to negligently risk causing a particular form of loss. See KENNETH S.
ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 61 (5th Ed. 2017). When this
happens it often incorrectly appears that an artificial restriction on liability for
negligence has been removed, not that a new form of liability—and certainly not a new
tort—has been created. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d
477, 478–81 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (adopting negligence liability for a landlord’s failure to
maintain adequate security by relaxing no-duty restriction on liability); Dillon v. Legg,
441 P.2d 912, 916–17, 924–25 (Cal. 1968) (adopting liability for negligent infliction of
emotional distress by relaxing no-duty restriction on liability).

2092

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:2089

are created has become static, or even moribund. In our judgment,
this conclusion may soon prove to be dramatically incorrect. If harms
involving tangible, physical forces—railroads, cars, durable products,
drugs, and chemical wastes—were the stuff of twentieth-century tort
law, harms involving intangible forces and intangible harms—
invasions and misuses of digitized personal data, and sexualized
attitudes and misconduct, for example—may be the stuff of the law of
torts in the twenty-first century. 5
For this reason, the law of torts of the future may be the farthest
thing from static or moribund. Rather, it may well become a prime
battleground for working through the rights and liabilities that govern
harms characteristic of the information age. Indeed, the parallels
between the present period and the era of 1960 to 1985, which was the
most dynamic period in the history of the law of torts, are striking and
suggestive. Because of social pressure for tort law to expand both
negligence and strict liability, the earlier period witnessed tremendous
ferment, turmoil, and the consequent explosion of liability for physical
harm caused by the tangible, physical forces of the industrial era. 6
The present age may be about to witness the same degree of social
pressure, with corresponding turmoil and expansion of liability for
intangible forces and the intangible harms they cause. For example,
because of inadequate data security, cyber hacking now commonly
results in both economic loss and invasions of the privacy of those
whose credit accounts or digitized personal information have been

5. Tort law tends to protect against physical harm—bodily injury and property
damage (and their consequences)—and to compensate victims who suffer those
physical harms more rigorously than other forms of harm, such as “pure”
(freestanding) emotional suffering and economic loss. See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at
272. We use the term “tangible” to refer to overtly physical forces and overtly physical
harms and the term “intangible” to refer to forces (cyber invasions, for example) and
harms (emotional and economic loss, for example) that are not overtly physical.
Obviously, we recognize that cyber invasions have a physical component, even when
that component is not overt and observable. In addition, by describing emotional and
economic harm as “intangible,” we do not mean that these harms are any less real or
important than physical harms. Rather, our reference to “tangible” and “intangible”
forces and harms is a shorthand designed to capture the general distinction between
two subject matters that the law of torts, as it now stands, usually treats differently.
6. See generally George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History
of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 461 (1985)
(reflecting on the dramatic “conceptual revolution” in tort law between 1960 and
1985); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American
Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 601, 604–05 (1992) (noting the uncertainty and vitality,
which resulted from a “huge growth in tort liability”).
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hacked. 7 In addition, varieties of sexual and sexualized misconduct
recently have garnered much more attention and concern than in the
past. 8 Each of these forms of wrongful conduct generates mainly
intangible loss rather than physical harm.
The form taken by any new tort liabilities arising out of these and
similar wrongs will be important to the development and predictability of
those liabilities, and to their impact on wrongful conduct. The dominant
form that new liabilities took in the twentieth century was through the
establishment of new, particularized torts. An alternative but much less
known form of liability, however, competed with the named-tort
approach during this same period, and to some extent still competes with
it. This is the application of what we call a “residual category” of liability.
The idea of a residual category of tort liability first surfaced more
than a hundred years ago, when Oliver Wendell Holmes partly
described, and partly proposed, that there be tort liability for
“intentional infliction of temporal damage.” 9 Cases decided in the
following decades imposed liability on grounds that appeared to
reflect this residual category, which came to be principally illustrated
in the concept of what eventually was termed “prima facie tort.” 10 This
alternative approach turned out to garner very little, actual support in
decided cases, but it continues to be asserted sporadically as a potential
basis for the imposition of liability in lawsuits around the country. 11 In
our view, however, a residual category approach to the intangible
harms of the twenty-first century should and would fail in the same way,
and for the same reasons that this approach largely failed in the
twentieth century. The new torts of the twenty-first century will have
to be particular, named torts.
This Article explains why this will be the case, and then undertakes
to demonstrate how these explanations apply to the most salient forms
of intangible harm on the current scene—harms that inevitably will be
candidates for tort liability in the years to come. Part I develops a
general theory of the preconditions necessary to the adoption of new torts
and the variety of obstacles that potential new torts must surmount if they
are to be adopted. In Part II, we explore the history of Holmes’s contention
7. See infra Section III.A–B (discussing negligent release of hacked consumer
credit information and confidential information).
8. See infra Section III.C (discussing intentional or negligent sexualized
misconduct in the rise of the MeToo movement).
9. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3
(1894) [hereinafter Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent].
10. See infra Sections II.B–C.
11. See infra Sections II.B–C.
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that there was a residual category of tort liability for “intentional
infliction of temporal harm” subject to “justification.” In addition to
Holmes, this contention had eminent supporters—Pollock, Bohlen, and
Prosser, among others. Yet, as we show, in the form in which those
luminaries described it, this general, residual category of liability was
never established as a robust alternative to the adoption of particular,
named torts. In Part III, we apply our analysis of how new torts become
“named” and their scope becomes defined to several potential new torts
of the future, all involving intangible forces or harms likely to be salient
during the rest of the century. We identify the aspects of each form of
loss that we think may well become actionable through the adoption of
new torts or the expansion of existing torts, as well as the aspects of loss
that will continue not to be actionable.
We conclude by arguing that, despite the fact that invasions of intangible
“rights” or “interests” may be more common in the future and may
increasingly be perceived as wrongs that reflect widespread social concern,
the invasions should not be, and are unlikely to be, redressed through the
application of a residual category of liability for the intentional infliction of
intangible harm. Rather, we contend that if new torts associated with
intangible forces and harms are adopted, they will be discrete, concrete,
and contained. In short, any residual potential tort liability that exists will
manifest itself in the expansion of existing torts or the establishment of new
torts with discrete elements and defined limitations—torts with names.
I. A GENERAL THEORY OF THE PRECONDITIONS TO THE EMERGENCE
OF NEW TORTS
Our focus here is on torts that have come into existence or have been
proposed or considered, but failed to come into existence, during roughly
the last century, and torts that might come into existence in a future that
bears some resemblance to the present. 12 Any theory must explain not
only positive but also negative evidence. Ours therefore seeks to explain,
12. Although the account in this Part does not directly address how and why all of
the existing torts came into being, what we have to say applies in many ways to the
existing torts. There is a core set of torts involving the interests in bodily security and
rights of property, for example, that have long been in force and whose existence can
easily be explained and justified by the importance of the interests they protect:
assault, battery, negligence, liability for defective products, trespass to property, and
nuisance. A number of torts that protect other interests are also subject to ready
explanation and justification because of the interests they protect: fraud, defamation,
and intentional interference with contract, for example. The tort system long ago
picked all of this low-hanging fruit. That fruit is not our concern. For an effort to
explain how to intentionally create a new tort, however, see generally Anita Bernstein,
How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1539 (1997).
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among other things, why potential torts that some people thought were
going to emerge, or might have emerged, did not do so. 13
The first step in our inquiry is to identify what it takes for a new form of
tort liability to come into being. There are four preconditions relevant to the
establishment of a new tort. The more clearly one or more preconditions is
satisfied in a particular situation, the less important complete satisfaction of
the other conditions is likely to be.
A. Social Salience and Normative Weight
The first and predominant precondition to the imposition of tort
liability, and therefore to the emergence of a new tort, is the perceived
wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct. Perceived wrongfulness often is
reflected in concern outside the legal system that transforms what would
otherwise be a technical doctrinal issue into a social problem presented to
the courts for solution. “Social salience” and “normative weight” are not
really separate phenomena. They overlap and reinforce each other.
Nonetheless, we address these closely related factors separately in order to
tease out their slightly different aspects.
1.

Social salience
At various times, widespread perceptions surface that certain kinds of
conduct are causing harms to others and that the conduct and resulting
harms are socially troublesome enough to amount to “wrongs.” One
example of this phenomenon was the emergence, about a century ago, of
causes of action in tort for pure emotional distress.14
Prior to the emergence of causes of action for intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress, courts denied such recovery

13. On this score, theories of torts often have little to say. For example, the most
prominent civil recourse theorists have written extensively on what characterizes torts
and have sought to explain why torts are legal wrongs even when they are not moral
wrongs but say much less about why some acts or omissions that might count as legal
wrongs do not. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs,
88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 918–19, 937 (2010) (explaining how courts must consider social
policy as well as economic and political circumstances when deciding whether a
particular act is justiciable). Similarly, corrective justice theorists explain the structure
of tort liability but not why certain injustices are not subject to tort liability. The closest
statement addressing this issue we have found in the work of one of the leading
corrective justice theorists is that the “plaintiff’s injury must be to something, such as
personal integrity or a proprietary entitlement, that ranks as the embodiment of a
right.” ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 134 (1995). Nor have we found
anything expressly addressing the issue in one of the leading instrumental works,
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987).
14. See PROSSER, supra note 3, at 216–17.
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on a number of grounds. 15 Those barriers to recovery were then
surmounted because of developments outside the legal system. Society
began to take genuine emotional harm more seriously, rather than
dismissing it as frivolous, idiosyncratic, or simply as a necessary
condition of human interaction. This was partly because the
professionalization of specialists in mental health made emotional
harm diagnosable and treatable. 16 They could diagnose genuine
emotional distress and distinguish it from idiosyncratic or feigned
distress. 17 In addition, the costs of diagnosing and treating emotional
harm could be quantified. 18 The previously speculative character of
emotional harm and of the damages that might be awarded to people
who had suffered it was thereby reduced. And as those developments
occurred, the difficulties presented to the legal system from feigned or
frivolous claims, or from massive litigation, were perceived as
surmountable. 19 Cumulatively, this social recognition of genuine
emotional loss resulted in tort liability emerging as a basis for the
redress of some conduct producing purely emotional harm. 20
Analogous social salience can be observed in the emergence in the
1960s of strict liability for manufacturing defects—departures from the
manufacturer’s intended design—in products that caused harm to the
users and consumers of those products. 21 The mass manufacturing
15. One was that emotional harm itself was too idiosyncratic and too speculative
to be capable of being concretized in the form of an actionable wrong. A second,
related reason was that because of the idiosyncratic nature of emotional harm,
damages for that harm were impossible to measure. The last reason was that if the tort
system allowed recovery for emotional harm, it would be overwhelmed with frivolous
or feigned claims, opening up the floodgates of litigation that would clog courts’
dockets. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 822–24 (2000).
16. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 103
(expanded ed. 2003).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 105.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 102–06.
21. Initially, tort remedies for negligently caused defects in products were available
only to those in privity (contractual relations) with the persons responsible for the
defects. But after the rise of mass production and distribution, the typical user or
consumer of a product was no longer the person in privity with the product’s
manufacturer; the person in privity was more typically a retailer who did not use the
product but sold it to a consumer. Thus, the liability of manufacturers for negligentlycaused defects in their products was extended beyond retailers to consumers. The
theory of that extension was that the manufacturer was aware that its product was going
to be used by consumers rather than retailers, and that if it negligently caused defects
in the product, it would be the consumers rather than the retailers who were likely to
be injured. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051, 1053–55 (N.Y.

2019]

TORTS WITHOUT NAMES

2097

and distribution of products in the twentieth century had resulted in
countless products reaching the hands of consumers that had been
manufactured by enterprises with which they had virtually no
connection. For manufacturers to profit from selling such products,
yet to bear no responsibility for the injuries they caused when the
manufacturer’s negligence could not be pinpointed, seemed unfair. 22
The point here is simply that the emergence of liability for pure
emotional distress and of strict liability for manufacturing defects was
driven not only by technical, doctrinal considerations that were
completely internal to the tort system. Those doctrinal changes—in
effect the adoption of new torts—reflected attitudes in the world
outside the legal system about responsibility for those losses.
2.

Normative weight
A second factor is the wrongfulness of the conduct that would be
subject to a potential new tort. Social salience and normative weight
are closely related because the more wrongful the conduct, the more
socially salient it is likely to be. The elements of a new tort then tend
to reflect this connection by focusing on what is most wrongful about
the conduct in question. The courts ensured that the principal new
torts established in the twentieth century satisfied this condition by
making only the most blameworthy forms of the conduct they
addressed subject to liability. 23 Thus, IIED is actionable only if the
defendant’s conduct in causing distress was “extreme and outrageous.”24
Analogous requirements apply in the torts involving invasion of
privacy. Intrusion on seclusion is actionable only if the intrusion is
intentional and would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.” 25
Public disclosure of true private facts is actionable only if the matter

1916) (holding Buick liable for negligence even though the vehicle was sold to the
plaintiff indirectly through a retailer).
22. See Note, The Cutter Polio Vaccine Incident: A Case Study of Manufacturers’ Liability
Without Fault in Tort and Warranty, 65 YALE L.J. 262, 263–64 (1955) (“Policy
considerations indicate that Cutter should be liable to persons who contracted polio
from live virus in the vaccine it manufactured, without regard to whether it was at
‘fault.’”). For an expression of the legal arguments reflecting these social concerns,
see Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (en banc) (Traynor,
J., concurring).
23. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46–48 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
24. Id. § 46.
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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publicized would be both “highly offensive to a reasonable person” and
“is not of legitimate concern to the public.” 26
A second aspect of normative weight is the extent to which the wrong
in question can be fitted into an already-existing tort. The greater the
fit, the smaller the residuum of wrongs that will go unredressed if a
new tort is not created. Conversely, the lesser the fit, the larger the
category of unredressed wrongs and the more likely the courts are to
create a new tort. For example, intrusions on seclusion often did not
involve physical trespass because they occurred through sight or
hearing rather than physical presence, 27 and public disclosure of true
facts did not involve defamation because falsity of the defamatory
statement is an element of that tort. 28 Establishment of those new
causes of action redressed a major category of wrongful conduct that
trespass and defamation could not capture. 29

26. See id. § 652D. Similarly, placing a person in a false light is actionable only if it
would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person,” and the defendant had knowledge
of or acted in reckless disregard of the falsity in question. Id. § 652E. The last privacy
tort is appropriation of another’s name or likeness. This tort involves the wrongful
appropriation of an aspect of the plaintiff’s identity, resulting in either commercial
loss or personal distress. Id. § 652C. The scope of the torts of public disclosure and
false light is now limited, however, by First Amendment free speech principles. See
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989) (public disclosure); Cantrell v. Forest
City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 246, 249 (1974) (false light).
27. See, e.g., Pritchett v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 85 N.E. 32, 33 (Ind. App. 1908) (observing
the plaintiff from outside her property); McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
2 S.E.2d 810, 812 (Ga. Ct. App. 1939) (recording conversations).
28. DOBBS, supra note 15, at 1119–20.
29. On the other hand, much that now falls within the privacy torts of false light
and appropriation of name or likeness could well have fit within expanded versions of
defamation and conversion. Something like that might well have occurred had the
highly influential torts scholar William Prosser not contended early on that a single
tort of invasion of privacy was emerging. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 1050 (“The majority
of the courts which have considered the question have recognized the existence of a
right of ‘privacy,’ which will be protected against interferences which are serious, and
outrageous, or beyond the limits of common ideas of decent conduct.”). He later
recanted, for it soon became clear that there was no such residual category, even for
invasions of privacy. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 637 (2d ed.
1955) (indicating that invasion of privacy “appears in reality to be a complex of four
distinct wrongs”). Rather, there are now the four separate privacy torts. Similarly,
whether IIED could have been assimilated into assault, which already protected a
plaintiff’s interest in peace of mind, is a closer question. But once again, the eagerness
of legal scholars—this time Calvert Magruder and, again, Prosser—to synthesize
developments and, perhaps prematurely, denominate them as new torts, redirected
that approach. See, e.g., Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law
of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033–35, 1064 (1936); William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction
of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 874 (1939).
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Over the years, commentators have proposed the creation of a
number of new torts, some of which we think may not have developed
because much of the conduct in question could be characterized as
falling within the scope of an existing tort. Thus, a conventional cause
of action for battery applies to some forms of the proposed tort of
sexual fraud, 30 and with a bit of modification, it could apply to others. 31
Similarly, IIED applies to at least some forms of the proposed tort of
racial hate speech. 32 The availability of existing causes of action as a
means of remedying at least some of the wrongs that would fall within
the scope of potentially new torts takes the pressure off creating a new
cause of action, both by diminishing the normative appeal of a new
tort and, as a practical matter, 33 by giving plaintiffs and their lawyers
avenues of recovery that obviate the need to pursue establishment of a
new tort all the way through the otherwise necessary process of trial
(or summary judgment) and appeal.
The picture in the world of negligence liability is similar. Despite
the tendency of the courts and tort scholars to treat expansions of
liability in negligence as mere removal of restrictions on liability, new
causes of action in negligence often would be better understood to be
new torts recognizing the normative weight of the wrongs in
question. 34 Moreover, whether new forms of negligence liability are
considered new torts or mere relaxation of limitations on liability, it
would not be accurate to say that there is prima facie liability for negligently30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 15 cmt.
e (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2019) (a defendant’s failure to disclose to a
plaintiff that he has a sexually transmitted disease prior to consensual intercourse
constitutes battery).
31. See id. cmt. f (suggesting that a false statement to the plaintiff that the
defendant intended to marry her does not render consensual sexual intercourse a
battery); see also Jane E. Larson, “Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature
‘Deceit’”: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 379–80 (1993)
(proposing the tort of sexual fraud).
32. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.- C.L.L. REV. 133, 134, 179 (1982) (proposing
a tort based on intent to demean by reference to race).
33. See discussion infra Section I.D.
34. That was undoubtedly true of negligent infliction of “pure” emotional distress,
as courts came to acknowledge the seriousness of the emotional distress suffered by
the women who were so frequently plaintiffs in these cases, and the consequent
wrongfulness of risking this kind of loss. See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 272. The same
is true of the rise of manufacturer liability in negligence for product-related injury.
Nominally, this new liability came about through the abolition of a no-duty-in-theabsence-of-privity rule. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y.
1916). But for all practical purposes, products liability was a new tort, reflecting increased
recognition of the wrongfulness of manufacturing unduly dangerous products.
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caused harm. On the contrary, there is no general duty not to be
negligent, 35 and therefore no sense in which negligence resulting in
harm must always be justified in order to avoid liability for causing that harm.
In short, new forms of liability in negligence are not manifestations of any
residual category of liability for negligently-caused harm.
B. Justiciability
To be viable, a new tort must be justiciable, by which we mean amenable
to adjudication. Justiciability in this context has two features: the first
involving the elements of the tort and the second involving the damages
that are recoverable for committing it.
1.

Discreteness requirements
First, the elements of a new tort must be discrete, concrete, and
contained. A tort that would be open-ended will be unappealing to the
courts because of the difficulties they anticipate it would later pose for
them. The threat that there will not be a core set of routine facts to which
a new doctrine can be easily applied, but instead a series of lawsuits in which
the courts are called upon in each case to define the scope of and fashion
limits on liability, will discourage creation of a new tort. On the other hand,
if the scope of a potential new tort can be delineated to a reasonable extent
in the early stages of its development, the prospect of recognizing it will be
far less threatening.
The elements of the two core privacy torts discussed above, intrusion
on seclusion and public disclosure of true facts, satisfied this
requirement by specifying that the invasions in question must be
“highly offensive” to the reasonable person. 36 This was so obviously
limited to a discrete and contained (as well as normatively weighty)
category of invasions that there was little prospect of its generating a
series of suits posing challenges involving doctrinal formation and
open-ended boundaries. In addition, whether an invasion was “highly
offensive” posed a mixed question of fact and law, which meant that in
many instances, it would be unnecessary for the courts to define in
great detail the cases that fell into that category. Rather, if reasonable
people could disagree about that question, answering it became the
province of the jury, subject only to fairly general instructions.

35. See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 261.
36. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. The other two “privacy” torts
posed little challenge in this regard. False light was a close relative of defamation, and
appropriation in many instances involved the wrongful use of a commercial asset. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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The same was true of IIED, in which the defining and limiting
criterion of liability was that the infliction be “extreme and
outrageous.” 37 There would be few lawsuits with the potential to satisfy
this criterion. And the lynchpin of this cause of action also posed a
mixed question of fact and law that would be subject to application by
juries on a case-by-case basis, rather than requiring detailed, standard
development by the courts as a matter of law. 38
Some of the new torts proposed during recent decades may have
foundered because they did not promise this kind of discreteness and
limitability. A proposal for a tort of suppression of protected speech,
for example, contemplated a balancing of property and contract
interests against free speech rights in order to determine what counts
as an actionable suppression. 39 That would be a vague standard of
liability. On the other hand, the tort of spoliation of evidence, which
has now been recognized in several jurisdictions, has objectively
definable contours. It involves the failure to preserve property for
another’s use as evidence in pending or future litigation. 40 The failure
of this tort to become widely recognized must be ascribed to other
factors, most notably (as we indicate next) the difficulty of proving
cognizable damages resulting from breach.
2.

Cognizable damages
The second feature of justiciability is that the damages that are
awarded for commission of a new tort must be cognizable. Tangible
losses tend to be more quantifiable and therefore more cognizable
than intangible losses. This is one of the many reasons that liability for
bodily injury and property damage has thus far been more robust than
liability for intangible harm. Thus, neither the privacy torts nor IIED
had easily cognizable damages because the harm suffered by the
plaintiff was almost always exclusively emotional. 41 For this reason, the
courts had been reluctant, up to the point at which those torts were
recognized, to countenance awards for pure emotional loss. 42 A cause

37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
38. See id. § 46 cmt. h.
39. See, e.g., Rory Lancman, Protecting Speech from Private Abridgement: Introducing the
Tort of Suppression, 25 SW. L. REV. 223, 226, 245–55 (1996).
40. Terry R. Spencer, Do Not Fold Spindle or Mutilate: The Trend Towards Recognition
of Spoliation as a Separate Tort, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 37, 38, 39 (1993).
41. The exception was commercial appropriation when the plaintiff sought to
recover commercial losses.
42. See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 272.
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of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, for example,
had been recognized in only very limited circumstances. 43
We suspect that it was not merely increased comfort with awards of
damages for pure emotional loss that led to the courts’ acceptance of
causes of action that involved this form of loss in privacy and IIED
cases. Rather, the high degree of blame required for invasions of
privacy and IIED to be actionable meant that awards for compensatory
damages actually functioned something like punitive damages. Under
such circumstances, the courts could overlook the difficulties
associated with quantifying the amount of emotional loss the plaintiff had
suffered because they did not think of the awards as being completely
geared to the amount of loss the plaintiff had suffered as they would have
been in cases involving less blameworthy behavior by the defendant.
A number of contemporary proposals for new torts contemplate
awarding damages on a basis that would seriously fail the cognizability
test. For example, the damages available for suppression of protected
speech would compensate for “frustration, humiliation, feelings of
powerlessness,” and “the denial of a fundamental aspect of
citizenship.” 44 Similarly, a number of courts have refused to recognize
spoliation of evidence as a tort because of the uncertainties associated

43. For example, the “impact rule” that was in force for the first several decades of
the twentieth century required that the plaintiff have suffered a physical contact of
some sort, even if not an injurious contact, in order to recover damages for emotional
distress resulting from fear of injury. See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 272–73. Part of the
reason for this reluctance was that the courts lacked confidence in the verifiability of
such loss. But another reason was the difficulty of valuing the losses even when there
was no doubt that they had occurred.
Similarly, until well into the twentieth century, awards for the emotional losses suffered
by survivors resulting from the wrongful death of a loved one were either expressly
precluded (though the fact that juries awarded such damages anyway was an open
secret), or subject to a definite, and low, monetary ceiling. See id. at 255. The major
form of intangible loss that was recoverable at that point was of course the pain and
suffering associated with bodily injury. But awards for pain and suffering were
comparatively low until the middle of the twentieth century, and awards were
anchored, in practice, to the seriousness of a tangible physical injury. For example, as
late as 1961, a decision from the California Supreme Court, affirming a negligence
judgment for $187,000, including $53,000 for pecuniary losses, for injuries involving
serious, painful, and permanent injury to the plaintiff’s foot, elicited a dissent from
Justice Roger Traynor, arguing that the award of $134,000 for pain and suffering was
excessive. Seffert v. L.A. Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 339, 341, 344 (Cal. 1961) (en
banc) (Traynor, J., dissenting).
44. Lancman, supra note 39, at 260.

2019]

TORTS WITHOUT NAMES

2103

with damages that may have resulted from spoliation. 45 The marginal
cognizability of damages in many spoliation cases also seems related to
the difficulty of proving a causal connection between spoliation and
loss since the harm often involves impairment of the plaintiff’s ability
to have succeeded in a lawsuit, a quintessentially speculative question. 46
Unsurprisingly, many of the cases in which spoliation claims survive
motions for summary judgment adopt an approach to causation whose
proof is less problematic. 47
C. Essentiality: The Unavailability of Other Sources of Regulation or Relief
A third precondition to the emergence of a new tort is that the
wrongful acts in question are not effectively addressed already by a
source of law outside the common law of torts. When there is a
statutory or regulatory regime that addresses the wrongful acts that the
courts might otherwise hold are tortious, the probability that the courts
will create a new tort to deal with those wrongful acts declines. In such
a situation, the pressure to create a new cause of action will be less
intense than it would otherwise be. The courts will therefore be less
likely to perceive a need for redress in tort. For example, the U.S. Fair
Housing Act 48 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 49 both
prohibit various forms of discrimination and allow awards of damages,
as well as counsel fees, to successful complainants. 50 The existence of
these causes of action made it less likely that new torts redressing these
kinds of wrongs would be created.
It is worth noting that the causal sequence we are describing works
in both directions. Sometimes a regulatory regime comes into
existence precisely because tort law has been unable to address the
wrongful conduct in question. Environmental protection statutes,
such as the Clean Air Act, 51 were adopted, in part, because the law of
45. Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co., 796 F. Supp. 966, 966–69 (W.D. La. 1992);
Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434,
435, 438–39 (Minn. 1990) (en banc).
46. Spencer, supra note 40, at 53.
47. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Universal Scaffolding & Equip., LLC, 839 F.3d 599, 611
(7th Cir. 2016), remanded to 2017 WL 1382815, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2017) (requiring
only that the plaintiff prove that there would have been a reasonable probability of
success if the missing evidence were available); Danna v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., 213
So. 3d 26, 37 (La. Ct. App. 2016) (adopting a presumption that spoiled evidence would
have been unfavorable to the party who failed to preserve it).
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012).
49. § 2000.
50. §§ 2000e-5(g), 3613(c).
51. §§ 7401–71.

2104

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:2089

nuisance was not capable of deterring excessive pollution or
compensating its victims. 52 On the other hand, sometimes a new tort
emerges, in part, because there is no adequate regulatory regime
already addressing the problem. The tort of spoliation of evidence
seems to us to fit this pattern.
When a federal regulatory regime is in place, it may be held to preempt
state tort law or serve as the basis of a “regulatory compliance” defense when
a negligence suit is brought against the enterprise being regulated.53 In
both instances, regulatory regimes that are responses to newly emergent
social problems, such as the discovery of latent adverse effects from the use
of prosthetic medical devices or drugs,54 may serve to deter suits against the
manufacturers of those products, either because the regulatory regime
seeks to limit the scope of tort liability or because its regulations are treated
as absolving a manufacturer from negligence if complied with. Thus, when
pressure emerges to provide redress for a newly perceived social wrong, a
central preliminary question is whether there is an existing regulatory
response to the problem.
D. Practicality: A Critical Mass of Cases with the Potential for Substantial
Damages
Beyond the foregoing considerations, there are practical prerequisites
to the establishment of a new tort. There must be a sufficient number of
cases involving the tort for the courts to have the opportunity to develop
the contours of the tort and for law governing the tort to be articulated.
For this to occur, ordinarily the new tort must involve damages of
sufficient magnitude to encourage the filing of lawsuits by attorneys, who
typically are paid for their success on a contingent fee basis.
1.

A sufficient number of cases
The nearly infinite variety of life throws up any number of examples
of objectionable conduct that might otherwise qualify as tortious. But
the occasional one-off or rare instance of wrongdoing is unlikely to

52. There is wide agreement that the common law is a grossly inadequate method
of addressing modern pollution problems. This is recognized even by staunch
advocates of the common law. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
46–47 (2d ed. 1977).
53. For discussion, see Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO.
L.J. 2049, 2050 (2000); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An
Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 450 (2008).
54. See Editorial, 80,000 Deaths. 2 Million Injuries. It’s Time for a Reckoning on Medical
Devices., N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/04
/opinion/Sunday/medical-devices.html [https://perma.cc/F4SX-49LH] (noting
that problems with medical devices often take many years to emerge).
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generate a lawsuit or, if it does, is unlikely to prompt the courts to seriously
contemplate recognizing the conduct as tortious. First, without a critical
mass of cases, the courts simply will not have the opportunity to articulate
and develop the standards that govern a potential new tort. Faced with
allegations that may well seem to be one-of-a-kind, the courts will be
presented with a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint fails
to state a cause of action. When the courts conclude that the allegations
not only fail to fall into an existing form of tort liability but also that they
are unlikely to be repeated very often, the courts will be disinclined to
permit a suit to proceed. They are likely to shy away from recognizing the
kind of claim that they predict will end after just one case. Even if a court
did recognize a cause-of-action, the absence of subsequent cases involving
similar allegations would mean that the initial recognition had led nowhere,
making it an isolated, unclassified instance of something indeterminate. This
prospect will discourage permitting the imposition of liability in such cases.
In addition, if the courts perceive a case to be unique or extremely
unusual, the type of wrongful conduct in the case will not be understood
to require activating the “cumbrous and expensive machinery” of the state
to which Holmes famously referred. 55 Actions in tort are typically
perceived as addressing recurring patterns of misconduct that, precisely
because they recur, warrant legal intervention. One-off wrongs simply do
not qualify on this score. Although the perceived uniqueness of a form
of wrongful conduct is an index of the low social salience that we have
already identified as being a precondition to the development of a new
tort, it is a highly practical consideration as well: very unusual wrongs
are unlikely to be embraced by the tort system precisely because their
uniqueness suggests they are unlikely to recur across a range of cases.
2.

Adequate damages
The U.S. system of compensating plaintiffs’ attorneys reinforces the
points we have just made. Most attorneys representing plaintiffs in tort
actions take the cases on a contingent-fee basis. 56 If the plaintiff
recovers damages, either through judgment or settlement, then the
plaintiff’s counsel is paid a previously agreed-upon percentage of the
recovery. If the plaintiff recovers nothing, however, then the plaintiff’s
counsel is paid nothing. 57
As a consequence, plaintiffs’ attorneys make risk-reward calculations
in deciding which cases to take. A case with a low probability of success
55. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 88 (G. Edward White ed., 2009).
56. See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 4.
57. See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 4.
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must promise a significant payoff in the event that it is successful, or it
is not a good “bet” for an attorney considering whether to take the
case. Any case that would require establishing a new cause of action will
necessarily involve an investment by the plaintiff’s attorney that is
substantially in excess of the investment required in a case falling within an
established tort. Addressing legal issues of first impression at trial and on
appeal is costly. If a defendant who is a likely repeat-player in the event that
a new tort is established, or a liability insurer that will face repeated
claims for coverage in that event is involved, then the defendant will
oppose recovery even more strongly. Consequently, the investment of time
and money required by the plaintiff’s attorney will increase accordingly.
The upshot of these considerations is that cases that do not involve
significant potential damages are much less likely to materialize into
lawsuits than cases that have the prospect of a significant payoff in
damages. This means not only that any individual case must present such
a prospect, but also that there be some prospect that there will be other
cases in the future if a new tort is established, so that an attorney in the
first case can amortize his or her substantial investment in establishing a
new tort over a set of future cases, which will cost less per case to litigate
than the first case. To put it another way, the greater the probability
that the front-end cost of establishing a new tort can, in effect, be
recovered in future cases, the greater the likelihood that the effort to
establish a new tort will be undertaken. 58
II. PRIMA FACIE TORT AND THE QUEST FOR A RESIDUAL CATEGORY OF
LIABILITY
We have just argued that, unless a wrong satisfies the preconditions
to establishment of a new tort, it will not be established and will not be
named. An alternative view, however, is that tort liability can be based
on a residual category of tort liability that is always potentially available
to redress sporadic and isolated wrongs that otherwise would not be

58. In addition, because the plaintiff’s counsel is paid a percentage of any recovery,
the amount of damages that flow from a potential new tort will be an important
ingredient in decisions about whether to pursue a new cause of action. In our view,
cases that promise only vindication, or nominal damages that merely signify
indignation over the defendant’s behavior, are less likely to be brought. On the other
hand, cases in which the defendant’s behavior was sufficiently egregious to create the
potential for an award of punitive damages even when a plaintiff’s actual losses are
minimal are more likely to be brought. Since these are cases in which the defendant’s
behavior was intentional and possibly malicious, we should expect that, in cases where
actual damages are minimal, there will be more pressure to establish new intentional
torts than torts sounding in negligence or strict liability.
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actionable. 59 This view has had very respectable adherents, dating all
the way back to Holmes. 60
No one, to our knowledge, has ever contended that there is residual
liability in tort for “wrongful infliction of harm.” That would be a residual
category of tort liability as broad as there could be. The principal example
of a putative residual category of liability in tort involves a narrower, but
still comparatively broad, form of liability. This cause of action started
out as “intentional infliction of temporal damage,” which meant
something like inflicting “tangible” harm,61 and then evolved into what was
called “prima facie tort.” The rise of prima facie tort, and its subsequent
failure to mature and develop, is the best example we have of putative
residual liability in tort—a broad form of presumptive tort liability, without
a meaningful name—in actual operation.
This story demonstrates that there is an important distinction
between the potential for new forms of tort liability to be adopted and
the existence of a residual category of tort liability. The former potential
always exists, but that potential is not realized through the invocation
of the latter. This is the paradox of residual tort liability. No form of
liability supposedly falling within a residual category actually stays
there once it is recognized. Residual tort liability is, at most, merely a
conceptual placeholder. To demonstrate this, we canvass, in some
detail, the history of prima facie tort, explaining how it first existed
without bearing that name, was then recognized and named in a few
states, yet later proved to have little traction.
A. Holmes, Pollock, and the Early Cases
In the 1870s, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in the United States,62 and
Frederick Pollock, in England, both began publishing legal scholarship.63
59. See infra Sections II.A.1, II.A.2.
60. See infra Sections II.A.1, II.A.2.
61. Holmes seems to have been the first, or one of the first, to use the term
“temporal,” but he did not define what he meant by it. See Holmes, Privilege, Malice,
and Intent, supra note 9, at 3. It is possible that he meant “tangible” damage, such as
injury to person or property, as opposed to intangible damage such as emotional harm.
An alternative definition is “compensation in money as a substitute for and the
equivalent of the promised performance,” which to the modern ear sounds virtually
unlimited, and therefore is probably not accurate. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 55.1 (Joseph M. Perillo, revised ed. 2005).
62. Holmes and Pollock were contemporaries who first met in England in 1874
and would correspond with one another through 1932. See David H. Burton, The
Intellectual Kinship of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Frederick E. Pollock, and Harold J. Laski,
119 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 133–35 (1975).
63. Burton, supra note 62, at 133–35.

2108

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:2089

Holmes had contributed legal essays and digests of cases to the American Law
Review, of which he became co-editor in 1870, and in 1881, he published a
series of lectures known as The Common Law.64 Pollock’s Principles of Contract
at Law and in Equity appeared in 1876, and in 1887, he published the first
edition of his The Law of Torts.65 Both Holmes and Pollock were particularly
interested in deriving and articulating general principles of liability around
which common law subjects could be organized.
1.

Setting the conceptual stage
Holmes argued in The Common Law that standards of tort liability should
be objective rather than subjective and that there was a sharp distinction
between acts that offended morality and acts that were legally culpable.66 His
intuition seems to have been that malicious motives were irrelevant if one
kept within the law.67 Holmes’s initial inclination was thus to subsume
“malice” in “intent” and to treat the existence of intent as an objective
inquiry.68 A few years later, Frederick Pollock stated his position on the
same issue a bit differently:
There is no express authority that I know of for stating as a general
proposition of English law that it is a wrong to do wilful harm to one’s
neighbour without lawful justification or excuse . . . . Thus in the AngloSaxon laws . . . [o]nly that harm which falls within one of the specified
categories of wrong-doing entitles the person aggrieved to a legal remedy.
Such is not the modern way of regarding legal duties or remedies . . . .
The three main heads of duty with which the law of torts is
concerned—namely, to abstain from wilful injury, to respect the
property of others, and to use due diligence to avoid causing harm
to others—are all alike of a comprehensive nature. 69

In the meantime, Holmes’s thinking had evolved toward Pollock’s,
and he modified the position on “malice” that he had taken in The
Common Law. In an article in the Harvard Law Review in 1894, 70
Holmes maintained that “the intentional infliction of temporal
64. HOLMES, supra note 55, at xxxix, 1–2.
65. For more detail on Pollock’s early scholarship, see NEIL DUXBURY, FREDERICK
POLLOCK AND THE ENGLISH JURISTIC TRADITION 20–27 (2004).
66. HOLMES, supra note 55, at 102–03.
67. Id. at 131.
68. Id. at 132–33.
69. FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS: A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF
OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM CIVIL WRONGS IN THE COMMON LAW 21–22 (1887).
70. Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, supra note 9. For a discussion of the
evolution of Holmes’s thinking and an account of the rise of prima facie tort, see
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A History of Prima Facie Tort: The Origins of a General Theory of
Intentional Tort, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447, 447, 457–62 (1990).
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damage, or the doing of an act manifestly likely to inflict such damage
and inflicting it, is actionable if done without just cause.” 71
2.

The rise of the putative cause of action

Holmes’s formulation suggested that causing “malicious” economic
injury (for example, to a competitor) was prima facie tortious.72 But in
Holmes’s view, this seemingly residual category of potential liability did
not automatically result in liability for intentional economic damage
inflicted on another. 73 Such liability depended on whether the conduct
in question had a justification.74 This is evident in the cases in which
Holmes applied this principle after his Harvard article appeared. The
most important was Vegelahn v. Guntner, 75 in which workers went on
strike for shorter working hours and higher pay, organizing a picket line
outside Vegelahn’s factory and seeking to encourage persons to boycott
Vegelahn’s business or to discourage persons from doing business with or
working for Vegelahn.76 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
prohibited both the picketing and the boycott.77
In his dissent in Vegelahn, Holmes treated the case as demonstrating
that the “intentional infliction of temporal damage” was “warrant[ed]”
71. Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, supra note 9, at 3. First, he acknowledged
that a finding of “malice” might in itself subject a party to tort liability even if his
conduct was not otherwise unlawful. Id. “Malice” was no longer subsumed in the
category of “intent;” it was an independent basis of liability. Id. Second, whereas in
The Common Law Holmes had treated “malice” as part of a continuum of foreseeability
that also included “intent” and “negligence,” see HOLMES, supra 55, at 131–33, and as a
tool serving to clarify whether a defendant’s conduct had violated a standard of
liability, his analysis of “malice” in Privilege, Malice, and Intent was centered on
justification and excuse. Intentional injury resulting in “temporal” damage was now
presumed to be actionable unless a defendant could show that his or her actions were
not “malicious” because they were justified. See Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent,
supra note 9, at 3.
72. See Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, supra note 9, at 7–8.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896).
76. The case first came to Holmes, sitting as a trial judge in an equity court, in the
form of an injunction against the picketing and the boycott. Holmes issued a partial
injunction preventing the striking workers from obstructing the door of Vegelahn’s
factory or threatening violence against persons who sought to enter it, but allowed
both the picketing, so long as it was conducted peacefully, and the boycott to continue.
Id. at 1077. During the years that Holmes served on the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts (1882 to 1902), all of the justices of that court were expected to spend
part of their time traveling around the state and serving as trial judges, sometimes in
law courts and sometimes in equity courts. For more detail, see G. EDWARD WHITE,
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 255–56 (1993).
77. Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1078.
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by the “law” when it was “justified.” 78 In “numberless instances,”
Holmes wrote, an actor could intentionally do harm to another if the
basis for inflicting that harm was justifiable. 79 Whether the harm was
justifiable turned on “considerations of policy and of social
advantage.” 80 Holmes thought that in the context of labor disputes,
efforts on the part of workers to secure better wages and working
conditions justified strikes, boycotts, and picketing in pursuit of those
aims, so long as they were peaceful. 81 In short, Holmes had announced
the proposition that the intentional infliction of temporal damage was
tortious unless justifiable in order to focus on justifiability, and in
Vegelahn, had analyzed justifiability to limit the scope of liability.
Holmes was the lone dissent in Vegelahn.82 But despite focusing on the
justification for “intentional infliction of temporal damage,” rather than the
mere fact that acts had been done intentionally or had caused harm, he still
acknowledged the possibility that a number of such inflictions might end up
being actionable.83 Similar opinions, applying similar logic and doctrinal
structure, followed,84 often with Holmes dissenting but sometimes in the
majority depending on what counted as sufficient “justification.”85
78. Id. at 1080 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1081–82.
82. Ironically, he believed that since his opinion apparently took the side of labor
against capital in an industrial dispute, it would end up being something he “may have
to pay for [ ], practically, before I die.” Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. Correspondence with Lady
Clare Castletown (November 21, 1896), in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES PAPERS (Microfilm
ed. 1985), quoted in WHITE, supra note 76, at 289.
83. Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1080–81 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
84. In Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011, 1015 (Mass. 1900), a majority of Holmes’s
Massachusetts judicial colleagues ended up agreeing with him that justifiability was the
critical inquiry in such cases, and that justifiability was a matter of social policy. But
once again, in a labor dispute, the majority found that efforts by members of workers
to disparage their opponents were not justifiable and thus actionable if they could be
shown to produce damage. Id. “The necessity that the plaintiffs should join this
association is not so great,” the majority declared, “such as to bring the acts of the
defendant under the shelter of the principles of trade competition.” Id. The plaintiffs
had “the right . . . to be free from molestation.” Id.
85. Similarly, in Moran v. Dunphy, 59 N.E. 125, 126 (Mass. 1901), the defendant
made comments about the plaintiff to the plaintiff’s employer that eventually caused
the employer to fire the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued for intentional interference with
contractual relations, a recognized tort. Id. Holmes, overruling a demurrer to the
action granted by a trial court, held that “to induce a third person to end his
employment,” when done “maliciously and without justifiable cause,” was “an
actionable tort.” Id. Technically, the decision only allowed the case to go forward:
Holmes and his colleagues did not pass on the justifiability of the defendant’s actions
or even note what the defendant’s purported justification was. Moreover, Holmes
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After Holmes was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, he was afforded
another opportunity to articulate the elements of the form of residual liability
in tort he had been identifying. The case, Aikens v. Wisconsin,86 did not come
to the Court as a common law decision, but as a challenge to the
constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute prohibiting the combination of
two or more persons from willfully or maliciously interfering with
another in trade or business. 87 Since the defendants had admitted that
they had malicious motives in making the agreement, and the Wisconsin
court had stopped short of concluding that the statute could fairly be
applied to non-malicious “willful” acts as well as malicious acts, the case
reduced itself to whether a legislature could constitutionally punish
malicious acts that damaged others. 88
This led Holmes to assert that the acts of the defendants would have
been actionable at common law. 89 In his assertion, Holmes provided
his clearest statement of the elements of that action. “It has been
thought by other courts as well as the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,”
he maintained, “that such a combination followed by damage would
be actionable even at common law. It has been considered that, prima
facie, the intentional infliction of temporal damage is a cause of action,
which . . . requires a justification if the defendant is to escape.” 90 In
addition, because “malicious mischief is a familiar and proper subject
for legislative repression,” he was prepared to conclude that “[i]t
would be impossible to hold that the liberty to combine to inflict such
mischief . . . was among the rights which the Fourteenth Amendment
was intended to preserve.” 91

treated the case as involving intentional interference with contract rather than a prima
facie tort. But his analysis suggested that he was inclined to extend his emphasis on
justification to other torts in which persons intentionally interfered with the business
relationships of others. The cognizability of the tort of intentional interference with
contract, at a time when the concept of an all-purpose tort of intentional, unjustifiable
infliction of temporal damage was still largely unrecognized, can be put down to the
value afforded “rights” of property and contract and the importance attributed to
preserving the stability of contracts in late nineteenth-century America. See Stephen
A. Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the PropertyPrivilege Distinction and “Takings” Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1986);
Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK.
L. REV. 767, 778 (1989).
86. 195 U.S. 194 (1904).
87. Id. at 201–02.
88. Id. at 202, 206–07.
89. Id. at 204.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 205.
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Finally, Holmes suggested that when what he called “disinterested
malevolence” could be shown as a basis for the intentional infliction of
temporal damage, it could serve to take such actions “out of the
justification by the motive with which they were made.” 92 Although
Holmes did not make explicit whether a tort action could be
maintained if “disinterested malevolence” was paired with some other
appropriate motive, such as further competition in business or
securing leverage in labor negotiations, he said that the statute in
Aikens should be limited to “combinations of a kind for which no
justification could be offered.” 93
In light of the progression of those decisions, at this point, it would
have been plausible to conclude that there was an emerging residual
category of liability for “intentional infliction of temporal damage,” 94
and that “disinterested malevolence” 95 would be a key to determining
when there was liability and when there was a justification that
insulated a potential defendant from liability. Certainly, the broad
language that Holmes used would have supported that conclusion.
But given the actual facts of the cases in which this kind of broad
language had been used, a different conclusion would also have been
possible. All of the cases we have discussed, in which Holmes and
others articulated a broad principle that could be understood to be
applying a residual category of liability, involved labor disputes. In
each of those disputes, multiple parties, or an organization composed
of multiple parties, were the defendants, and the common
characteristic of the alleged wrongful conduct was that the defendants
had acted in concert. The crux of the alleged wrong was the exercise
of collective power to affect market competition. In the cases we
discussed above and in his writing, Holmes took the position that this kind of
conduct was not actionable when it was not violent.96 The point, however, is
that whether or not the conduct was actionable in a particular case, use of
this particular species of market leverage by labor was often considered
wrongful in the laissez-faire world of the late nineteenth century and that was
what the cases were all about. Once we understand labor disputes to be the
subject matter of these cases, then the proposition that liability in those
cases, when it was imposed, was for “intentional infliction of temporal

92. Id. at 206.
93. Id.
94. Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, supra note 9, at 3.
95. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 206 (1904).
96. See id. at 203–04; Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081–82 (Mass. 1896)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, supra note 9, at 3–4.
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damage,” ends up being considerably broader than is necessary to explain
what was going on in the decided cases.
Nonetheless, after the labor cases faded into the background, those cases
and the doctrinal explanation that had been given for them were invoked
by some courts in another set of cases in business settings that did not
involve contests between labor and management.97 But not all courts took
this route. Rather, other courts began to recognize that many of the cases
involved, or could be explained by reference to, a narrower basis of liability,
which would come to be called “intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage.”98 We therefore turn next to those two lines of cases.
B. Two Different Lines of Doctrinal Development
The stage was set, then, for two different lines of authority to be discerned.
What happened was as follows. The tort of interference with prospective
economic advantage emerged and thrived. But over time, this tort proved to
be even more limited than had once been thought and, for this reason,
proved to be quite different from the putative cause of action for intentional
infliction of temporal harm. At the same time, the notion that there was also
a residual category of liability for intentional interference with temporal
advantage was separately maintained in a few jurisdictions, but barely
developed.99 Where this basis for the imposition of liability was recognized,
it came to be called “prima facie tort.”100
1.

Interference with prospective economic advantage
The foundations of this tort were laid in Temperton v. Russell, 101 an
1893 English decision, in which the court held, by analogy to the
existing tort of inducing breach of contract, that inducing someone
not to enter into a contract also could be actionable under some
circumstances. 102 The facts in the case were similar to those in the U.S.
labor dispute cases invoking Holmes’s rationale. But the rationale for
the imposition of liability for interfering with prospective economic
advantage, and the situations to which the tort applied, were obviously
narrower.
American courts soon picked up the theme. Sometimes the courts
were not entirely clear which cause of action was involved. In the
97. See infra Section II.B.2.
98. Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 752 (Cal. 1995)
(Mosk, J., concurring).
99. See infra Section II.B.1.
100. See infra Section II.B.2.
101. [1893] 1 Q.B. 715 (Eng.).
102. Id. at 734–35.
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celebrated case of Tuttle v. Buck, 103 for example, a wealthy banker
opened up a barber shop, allegedly for the sole purpose of driving an
existing barber out of business. 104 In the barber’s suit against the
banker, the Minnesota Supreme Court allowed the case to proceed. 105
The court said that the proposition that malicious motives could not render
an otherwise lawful action unlawful was flawed.106 What was “lawful” was
based on grounds of policy, and sometimes “[t]he purpose for which a man
is using his own property may . . . determine his rights.”107 Where the sole
purpose of operating a business was to drive a competitor out of business
rather than to make a profit, that conduct was unlawful.108 The court cited
Pollock’s treatise and suggested that the basis of liability, if it were imposed,
would be for intentional infliction of temporal damage, without
justification.109 Other cases followed. 110
By 1941, the cause of action had acquired the name “interference with
prospective economic advantage.” In a section of Prosser’s treatise titled,
“Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage,” he described the case
law of 1941 as follows:
[S]ince a large part of what is most valuable in modern life depends on
“probable expectancies” . . . the courts must do more to discover, define
and protect them from undue interference . . . . For the most part the
“expectancies” thus protected have been those of future contractual
relations . . . the tort began with “malice,” and it has remained a matter,
at least, of intent to interfere.111

After this, the case law accumulated further, and in 1979, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts referred to the tort as “Intentional
Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations,” providing that
there was liability when an actor intentionally and improperly engaged
in this form of interference. 112 As time went on, however, the courts
recognized that, as in Tuttle v. Buck, whether the defendant had mixed
103. 119 N.W. 946 (Minn. 1909).
104. Id. at 946.
105. Id. at 947.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 948.
109. Id. at 947.
110. See, e.g., Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 134–35, 138 (Tenn. 1915) (upholding
cause of action against defendant who out of ill will attempted to drive a boarding
house out of business); Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 132 N.W. 371, 376 (Iowa 1911)
(holding that an action would lie when agents of defendant conveyed false information
about plaintiff and harassed its employees).
111. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 1015–17.
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: APPENDIX VOLUME THROUGH JUNE 1987
§ 766B (AM. LAW INST. 1989).
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motives often rendered decisions difficult. 113 For decades, as the
Restatement (Third) of Torts recently put it, the courts “sometimes hedged
on the extent to which the defendant’s motives” were “relevant,” focusing
instead on the means the defendant had used to interfere with the
plaintiff’s prospects.114 Consequently, the defendant’s motive has now
fallen completely out of the picture, and there is liability, regardless of
motive, only if the defendant “committed an independent legal
wrong,” though not necessarily a tortious one. 115 Probably the most
prominent recent case to make that clear was decided by the Supreme
Court of California in 1995. 116
2.

Prima facie tort
In contrast, the subsequent development of liability for intentional
infliction of temporal damage, which led to prima facie tort, was
considerably more limited. A prominent precursor here was Beardsley
v. Kilmer, 117 in which the defendant was the manufacturer of a patent
medicine known as “Swamp Root” that he and his father sold in
Binghamton, New York. 118 The plaintiff, owner of a local newspaper,
published a series of articles about the medicine, which suggested that
it had few medicinal properties. 119 The defendant, after unsuccessful
efforts to get the plaintiff to cease writing about his product, opened a
rival newspaper, which eventually had the effect of attracting subscribers,
employees, and advertisers from the plaintiff’s newspaper, causing it to
close.120 The court held that “lawful” actions undertaken solely out of
“malicious” motives could be deemed unjustifiable and actionable. 121
In Beardsley, however, the defendant apparently had some experience
in the newspaper industry before starting a competing paper and
continued to operate his paper after the plaintiff had closed his. 122 The
defendant’s prior experience suggested to the New York Court of
Appeals that his motives were mixed and, in its view, defeated

113. Tuttle, 119 N.W. at 947–48.
114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 17 (AM. LAW
INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2018).
115. Id. § 17(b).
116. Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A, Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 751 (Cal. 1995)
(Mosk, J., concurring).
117. 140 N.E. 203 (N.Y. 1923).
118. Id. at 203.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 205.
122. Id. at 204.
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recovery. 123 “[T]he genesis which will make a lawful act unlawful,” the
court announced, “must be a malicious one unmixed with any other
and exclusively directed to injury and damage of another.” 124
In retrospect, the facts in Beardsley seem highly similar to those in
Tuttle v. Buck. Both can be understood to involve interferences with
business opportunities. But Tuttle v. Buck became a seminal case in the
development of interference with prospect economic advantage, 125
whereas Beardsley was a precursor of prima facie tort.
Nevertheless, there also were a few cases that were not described, or
at least could not easily be described, as intentional interference with
prospective advantage. This is because they involved loss that did not
arise out of interference with a business opportunity. Those cases
might well have been examples of a residual, unnamed category of tort
liability, but there were so few of them that describing them as
members of a “category” would have been strained.
In essence, they were outliers. For example, in one case, a defendant
utility company sought to undermine the influence of the plaintiff, a
prominent physician, regarding a forthcoming bond issue. 126 To do
this, the defendant attempted to induce the physician to perform an
illegal abortion. 127 Although the plaintiff sought damages measured
by the injury to his reputation and damage to his business, the
defendant’s purpose was to influence the election, not to interfere with
The court
the plaintiff’s prospective economic advantage. 128
nonetheless ruled that the case could properly be submitted to a jury. 129
Cases of this sort also appeared in the New York courts, and
occasionally, something like purely disinterested malevolence in a nonbusiness context was found to have existed. In Al Raschid v. News
Syndicate Co., 130 the defendant newspaper gave false information to
immigration authorities that caused the plaintiff to be arrested and
deported, despite his being a native-born American citizen. 131 He sued
for malicious prosecution, but that case was dismissed because the
123. Id. at 205.
124. Id. at 206.
125. For example, Minnesota, where Tuttle was decided, now characterizes the case
as establishing a cause of action for wrongful interference with non-contractual
business relationships. Witte Transp. Co. v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 193
N.W.2d 148, 151 (Minn. 1971).
126. Mangum Elec. Co. v. Border, 222 P. 1002, 1003–04 (Okla. 1923).
127. Id. at 1004.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1008.
130. 191 N.E. 713 (N.Y. 1934).
131. Id. at 713.
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information was disclosed in a deportation hearing, which was not a
judicial proceeding, and the defendant had not instituted any action
against the plaintiff. 132 After dismissal at the trial court level, the
plaintiff appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which held that
although the malicious prosecution claim was properly dismissed, the
plaintiff might maintain an action for the intentional infliction of
temporal damage without justification, citing Tuttle, Beardsley, and
Pollock’s treatise. 133 The court noted that the plaintiff had not alleged
the proper elements to make out a cause of action, but gave him ten
days to replead. 134 Nothing further was ever reported.
This was a rare, tenable example of the as-yet-unnamed, residual
category of prima facie tort. It did not involve concerted action in the
labor context, nor could it be characterized as intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage. But there were not many such
cases. Prior to 1946, the New York Court of Appeals had not referred
to prima facie tort by name, and most of the cases in which it had
suggested that there might be an action for the unjustified, intentional
infliction of temporal damage were ones in which other causes of
action also were alleged. 135 But in a 1946 case, the New York Court of
Appeals used the phrase “prima facie tort.” 136
In Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 137 the plaintiff had
published musical compositions in the form of sheet music, which it
then sold to jobbers and dealers in the music industry. 138 The
defendant compiled a weekly list of the nine or ten “most popular”
current songs in the nation, in the ostensible order of their popularity,
allegedly based on an extensive and accurate survey it conducted. 139
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s surveys repeatedly failed to
include its compositions in lists of popular songs or listed them in an
“improper order of popularity.” 140 The ratings of popular songs,
Advance Music charged, were simply “the choice or result of caprice
or other considerations foreign to a selection” based on accuracy. 141

132. Id.
133. Id. at 714.
134. Id.
135. See generally Vandevelde, supra note 70, at 487–91 (discussing the early stages
of development of the prima facie tort doctrine).
136. Id. at 447.
137. 70 N.E.2d 401, 403 (N.Y. 1946).
138. Id. at 401.
139. Id. at 402.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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The defendants had acted “wantonly and without good faith” in failing
to include Advance Music songs in its lists. 142
The plaintiff had suffered economic loss, but not through the
defendant’s having intentionally interfered with any particular
prospective contractual advantage of the plaintiff. The court held that
New York courts had adopted Holmes’s view that “prima facie, the
intentional infliction of temporal damages is a cause of action
which, . . . requires a justification if the defendant is to escape,” and
that the plaintiff “alleges such a prima facie tort and, therefore, is
sufficient in law on its face.” 143
Subsequent New York decisions, however, imposed three limitations on
this action.144 First, the infliction of harm had to be based solely on
“malice,” described by Holmes in Aikens as “disinterested malevolence.” 145
Mixed motives for a defendant’s conduct, such as those that appeared in
Beardsley and arguably in Tuttle, were insufficient.146 Second, prima facie
tort actions could only be brought where no other tort action was
available to a plaintiff. 147 Because many cases in which the intentional
infliction of temporal damage in a business context gave rise to an
action for intentional interference with contractual relations or with
prospective advantage, prima facie tort was limited to cases in which
the elements of those torts could not be satisfied. Finally, damages in
prima facie tort were limited to “special” damages, which typically
meant out-of-pocket losses and did not include emotional harm. 148
That limitation tended to exclude from the category of prima facie tort
any actions in which the defendant appeared to have intentionally and
gratuitously sought to injure the plaintiff, but the damage the plaintiff
suffered only was reputational and therefore not “special.” 149

142. Id.
143. Id. at 403.
144. See Ruza v. Ruza, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808, 810–11 (N.Y. 1955); Reinforce, Inc. v.
Birney, 124 N.E.2d 104, 105–07 (N.Y. 1954) (noting that the infliction of damage had
to be based on malice); Brandt v. Winchell, 127 N.Y.S.2d 865, 867 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954).
145. Reinforce, Inc., 124 N.E.2d at 104–06.
146. Id. at 106.
147. Ruza, 146 N.Y.S.2d at 810–11.
148. Id.
149. As the (yet unnamed) prima facie tort seemed to be establishing itself in New
York, the first Torts Restatement adopted a section 870, somewhat buried under the
category of “Miscellaneous Rules,” which provided that:
[A] person who does any tortious act for the purpose of causing harm to
another or to his things or to the pecuniary interests of another is liable to the
other for such harm if it results, except where the harm results from an outside
force the risk of which is not increased by the defendant’s act.
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Despite those limitations on the cause of action, however, in 1979,
the Restatement (Second) of Torts virtually duplicated Holmes’s broad
description of intentional infliction of temporal damage in Aikens. 150
“One who intentionally causes injury to another,” the provision read, “is
subject to liability to the other for that injury, if his conduct is generally
culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances.”151 The provision
added that “[t]his liability may be imposed although the actor’s conduct
does not come within a traditional category of tort liability.”152 Nowhere
was there mention of the three limitations New York courts had placed on
the prima facie tort. The provision (section 870) did add a
requirement that the conduct be “generally culpable,” 153 but folded
that requirement into unjustifiability, treating the intentional infliction
of damage without a justification as culpable conduct. 154
Adopted in 1977, a time when most observers thought that tort law’s
recent expansion would actively continue, section 870 laid out a
potential basis for the development of a broad category of residual
liability in tort. Like a number of other liability-expanding provisions
that have been adopted in Restatements with little case law to support

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 870 (AM. LAW INST. 1934). That formulation was curious.
The term “tortious” seemed to suggest that all the section was doing was allowing
recovery for purposeful acts that were torts. The limitation appeared to be only
directed toward causation. No mention was made of justifiability. Although a
comment suggested that it might provide a basis for recovery in cases where specific
torts were unavailable because of technical limitations on them, id. at cmt. c, on its
face, the term “tortious” in the section seemed to presuppose that the elements of
particular torts had been satisfied. Read that way, the section only codified intentional
torts that resulted in harm to persons, property, or pecuniary interests, all of which
were already in existence.
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at cmt. e. Whether the Reporters for the second Restatement (first Prosser
and then John Wade) intended section 870 to function as a residual category, or
instead to serve as a placeholder for new, named intentional torts, is not completely
clear. Comments to the last draft before adoption stated:
This Section is intended to supply a generalization for tortious conduct
involving harm intentionally inflicted . . . it has traditionally been assumed
that . . . intentional torts developed separately and independently, and not in
accordance with a unifying principle. This Section purports to supply that
unifying principle and to explain the basis for the development of the more
recently created intentional torts.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 39,
1975). The first portion of this passage suggests that the section reflected a residual
category, but the second suggests a somewhat different (“unifying”) function.
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them, 155 it might have been prophetic. At this point, therefore, the
idea that a residual category of tort liability existed had been widely
noted, if not necessarily widely accepted. Over the next few decades,
however, cases would demonstrate that, practically speaking, there was
no such residual category.
C. The Modern Period
It turned out that both Holmes and those responsible for section 870
were wrong. Prima facie tort has been adopted in only a few
jurisdictions. 156 And the even more broadly stated, arguably residual
cause of action adopted by section 870 has garnered little support. 157
Rather, most types of conduct, which might have constituted
intentional infliction of temporal damage without justification, fell
within the classic categories of other intentional torts, such as assault,
battery, intentional damage to property, false imprisonment, trespass,
malicious prosecution, or the later-appearing business torts of
interference with contract or interference with prospective advantage.
Each of those torts includes its own justifications for conduct that would
otherwise be actionable in the form of distinctive defenses and privileges.
Holmes and Pollock seem never to have envisioned this alternative
route to the development of previously unrecognized forms of tort
liability. Because they were so focused on conceptualizing a unified
theory of tort liability, what mattered most to them was identifying a
residual category of liability that was not exhausted by the existing
torts. 158 What Holmes would have said about the subsequent
emergence of new named torts, such as intrusion on seclusion, public
disclosure of true private facts, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, is unclear. All of those are intentional torts, though none
involves “temporal” damage.
1.

The near non-existence of prima facie tort in practice
Outside of New York, there are perhaps several dozen reported cases
in which the courts have contemplated prima facie tort without directly

155. Examples include RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST.
1979) (adopting promissory estoppel) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(AM. LAW INST. 1965) (adopting strict products liability).
156. See James P. Bieg, Prima Facie Tort Comes to New Mexico: A Summary of Prima Facie
Tort Law, 21 N.M. L. REV. 327, 343–47 (1991) (discussing the states that adopted the doctrine).
157. Id. at 347–49.
158. See e.g., Vandevelde, supra note 70, at 447, 471–74 (discussing Pollock and
Holmes’s influence on the development of the general theory of an intentional tort).
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rejecting it. 159 There are only three other states, however, in which it
can plausibly be said that prima facie tort has been squarely adopted:
Missouri, 160 New Mexico, 161 and Ohio. 162 Even in those states, the cause
of action sometimes is not favored. 163 One commentator has suggested
that there are a few other states in which adoption is arguably
implied. 164 But cases in which the prima facie tort allegation actually
bears weight are rare. Even in New York, where there have been over
a thousand reported cases mentioning prima facie tort, it has had the
same fate. The cause of action is applicable in only a tiny percentage
of those cases. 165
In the few jurisdictions where prima facie tort has been adopted,
allegations that fall within the tort are narrow. They are made
primarily in business contexts where a defendant’s conduct inflicted
pecuniary damage on a rival and was arguably unjustified, but could
not be made the basis of one of the classic actions because of technical
limitations on them. 166 In fact, as we have seen, New York, the leading
late twentieth-century jurisdiction that nominally had adopted prima
facie tort, limited the action to instances in which recovery in a classic
intentional tort was unavailable. 167
159. Bieg, supra note 156, at 343–47.
160. See Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265, 268, 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
161. Schmitz v. Smentowski, 785 P.2d 726, 734 (N.M. 1990).
162. Bajpayee v. Rothermich, 372 N.E.2d 817, 820 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977).
163. “Missouri courts, while recognizing prima facie torts at least nominally, do not
look upon them with favor and have consistently limited the application of the prima
facie tort.” Hertz Corp. v. RAKS Hosp., Inc., 196 S.W.3d 536, 549 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
164. See Frontier Mgmt. Co. v. Balboa Ins. Co., 658 F. Supp. 987, 994 (D. Mass. 1986)
(accepting prima facie tort as a valid cause of action in Nebraska); Newell Co. v.
William E. Wright Co., 500 A.2d 974, 980–81 n.4 (Del. Ch. 1985) (acknowledging
prima facie tort as a valid cause of action in Delaware); Vandevelde, supra note 70, at
485, 487, 495 (discussing the development of the doctrine in different states).
165. See Mark P. Gergen, Tortious Interference: How It Is Engulfing Commercial Law,
Why This Is Not Entirely Bad, and a Prudential Response, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1175, 1217 (1996)
(“But the theory of prima facie tort disappeared as a legal principle, other than in New
York (and perhaps a few other states), which adopted the theory in the crystallized
form of the doctrine of prima facie tort. The crystallized doctrine proved inert.”
(footnotes omitted)).
166. See, e.g., Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265, 266–68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)
(appealing the lower court’s dismissal of a negligence claim for failure to state a cause
of action in negligence and, instead, relying on the doctrine of prima facie tort; the
plaintiff argued that the defendant’s actions were willful and knowing and his sole
intention was to harm the plaintiff).
167. See, e.g., Ruza v. Ruza, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808, 810–11 (N.Y. 1955) (rejecting the
prima facie tort theory because remedy was available based on one of the traditional
torts); Brandt v. Winchell, 127 N.Y.S.2d 865, 868 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954) (stating that
when the plaintiff relies on the prima facie tort theory, he should limit his pleading to
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Moreover, it has been the rare case in which some form of
justification is completely unavailable. In cases that arise out of
business dealings, the motives of securing a profit, obtaining a
competitive advantage in the marketplace, or furthering one’s interest
in labor relations are readily discernible and serve as barriers to
findings of disinterested malevolence. Even a showing that a
defendant whose competition with another business forced that
business to close, but the defendant failed to operate a profitable
enterprise, as in the Beardsley case, would not necessarily result in such
a finding: a defendant might simply have erroneously assessed the
profitability of his or her undertaking. The combination of there
being few factual situations in which intentional injury causing damage
is not actionable under any other tort, and in which there was no
justification for the defendant’s conduct, has meant that very few standalone actions of prima facie tort have been brought, and even fewer have
been successful.168 These involve such conduct as improperly stopping
payment on a check,169 wrongfully seeking collection on a note, 170 and
humiliating an employee where the facts did not constitute intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 171
Turning specifically to New York, the picture is the same. “Pure”
cases in which no other cause of action is available are an endangered
species there too. We reviewed the one hundred most-cited New York
cases in which there was an allegation of prima facie tort.172 They were
decided between 1934 and 2009. We found only two cases that could
reasonably qualify as “pure.” These were Al Raschid, decided in 1934, and
Advance Music, decided in 1946, both of which we have already discussed.173

allegations limited to this tort and eliminate statements of injury and wrongdoing that
are more applicable to one of the traditional torts).
168. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 104,
Reporters Notes to cmt. a at 117–18 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015) (there
will be a new draft and it will become section 4).
169. Porter, 611 S.W.2d at 272.
170. Schmitz v. Smentowski, 785 P.2d 726, 738 (N.M. 1990).
171. Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 901 P.2d 761, 763 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).
172. On June 4, 2018, we did a Westlaw search of New York federal and state cases
using the search term “prima facie tort.” The search revealed 1074 such cases. We
then used the “Most Cited” filter to identify the 100 most cited such cases.
173. See supra notes 130, 137 and accompanying text. Similarly, Kenneth
Vandevelde reviewed thirty-five New York cases alleging prima facie tort that were
decided during the two-year period ending on May 31, 1990. In every case, the plaintiff
also alleged another cause of action, and the prima facie tort claim was unsuccessful.
See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Modern Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 79 KY. L.J. 519, 545–46
(1990–91).
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Rather, in the vast majority of those 100 cases, there were allegations
asserting multiple causes of action, and the courts dismissed
allegations of prima facie tort under the circumstances of each case.
In a few of the other cases, the courts declined to dismiss the count
alleging prima facie tort, despite the allegations involving other causes
of action, because it was possible in theory that the other causes of
action would prove to be unavailable. 174 Thus, it is only a small fraction
of New York cases in which prima facie tort allegations are not
dismissed outright. Given the possibility that the other alleged causes of
action will fail, and the fact that the allegations of prima facie tort are not
insufficient on their face, the latter sometimes are not dismissed.
All of this is confirmed by the ongoing projects in the Restatement
(Third) of Torts series. There is no mention of prima facie tort or
section 870 in Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm 175
or in Restatement (Third) of Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons. 176
The upshot of our examination of the cases in New York and
elsewhere, then, is this: cases in which the weight-bearing basis of
liability, or even of potential liability, is prima facie tort, are extremely
rare. We doubt that in the entire history of the tort, there are more
than a dozen reported cases, nationwide, in which the actual
imposition of liability on the basis of prima facie tort, and prima facie
tort alone, has been upheld on appeal.

174. For example, the allegation in Halperin v. Salvan, 499 N.Y.S.2d 55, 56–58 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1986), was that an attorney had instituted a baseless class action against the
plaintiff. The complaint alleged not only prima facie tort, but also libel and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 57–58. The court merely upheld the
trial court’s refusal to dismiss the complaint. Id. at 57. Similarly, in Cavanaugh v.
Doherty, 675 N.Y.S.2d 143, 146 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998), the plaintiff alleged that she was
dismissed from at-will employment because of her political views. She alleged not only
prima facie tort, but also (among other things) intentional interference with contract
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. Despite declining to dismiss a
number of the other alleged causes of action, the court also declined to dismiss the
allegations of prima facie tort. Id. at 150. Finally, in Board of Education v. Farmingdale
Classroom Teachers Ass’n, 343 N.E.2d 278, 279 (N.Y. 1975), the Board brought suit
against a teachers’ association for issuing subpoenas to eighty-seven teachers and
refusing to stagger their required court appearances. The complaint alleged both
abuse of process and prima facie tort. With regard to the latter, the court held that the
allegations could state a cause of action, regardless of what it was called, but noted that
“once a traditional tort has been established the allegation with respect to prima facie
tort will be rendered academic.” Id. at 285.
175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM (AM. LAW.
INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2018).
176. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS (AM. LAW.
INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015).
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2.

Taking stock
There is a close connection between the conditions necessary for the
establishment of new torts that we identified in Part I and the failure
of prima facie tort ever to develop. Prima facie tort never was able to
satisfy these conditions. Most importantly, this putative tort did not
have the discreteness necessary for it to be amenable to common law
adjudication; it was not justiciable in the sense that we described in
Part I. The great historian of the common law, Frederic William
Maitland, famously said that, although we have buried the forms of
action, “they still rule us from their graves.” 177 Maitland’s insight was
not only that the substance of the forms of action had stayed in force,
but also that the common law approach to adjudication still ruled, even
after the forms were abolished. 178 The essence of the common law
approach is the process of reasoning from precedents about causes of
action whose elements are discrete, contained, and limited. Without
satisfying these features of justiciability, a new tort cannot emerge and
thrive. For this reason, prima facie tort died on the vine.
Although prima facie tort is alleged a fair amount, considering the
hundreds of recent appellate decisions referencing the cause of action,
it is not a robust residual liability category even when, in theory, it is
available. Similarly, with or without express reference to prima facie
tort, section 870 is sometimes made the basis for allegations in a
complaint, both in states that have adopted prima facie tort and those
that have not. Such allegations receive the same negative reception as
prima facie tort itself. In some cases, the allegation is dismissed or is
regarded as immaterial to the issue a court is deciding. 179 In others, it
is treated as equivalent to prima facie tort 180 and rejected on this
ground. 181 Some courts, however, have invoked section 870 as the basis

177. FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 1 (A.H.
Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker, eds. 1909).
178. Id. at 1–4.
179. See, e.g., Bardes v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 1:11-CV-340, 2014 WL 12496540,
at *1 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 28, 2014), aff’d, 585 Fed. App’x 156 (4th Cir. 2014); Kurowski v.
Town of Chester, 172 A.3d 522, 523 (N.H. 2017); King & Mockovak Eye Ctr., Inc. v.
Mockovak, No. 74544-1-I, 2017 WL 4898237, at *1–2 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2017).
180. Bus. Payment Sys., LLC v. Nat’l Processing Co., No. 3:10-CV-00669, 2012 WL
6020400, at *21–22 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 3, 2012); Deutsch v. Backus Corp., No.
X07CV106022074S, 2012 WL 1871398, at *9–10 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 2, 2012).
181. Coachtrans, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 16-88, 2016 WL 4417261, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2016); Lips v. Scottsdale Healthcare Corp., 214 P.3d 434, 440 n.8
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 229 P.3d 1008 (Ariz. 2010).
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for creating new, named torts, thus treating it as a placeholder rather
than a residual category of liability. 182
The rejection of prima facie tort and of section 870 by the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, however, is not binding on the courts and does not
automatically deter plaintiffs’ attorneys from seeking to rely on them.
Consequently, the fact that section 870 is arguably broader than prima facie
tort—it has been the basis for allegations of liability for bodily injury and
emotional distress,183 for example—suggests that it, too, may be seen as
providing support for future suits alleging the existence of a residual
category of tort liability involving intangibles. Indeed, whether out of
stubbornness, desperation, or ignorance, plaintiffs’ lawyers seem not to
have gotten the message. They continue to invoke prima facie tort and
section 870 as alleged bases for the imposition of liability. In the entire history
of the action, a total of 3,813 reported cases have made reference to prima
facie tort.184 In just the period since the beginning of 2016—less than two
years prior to the time we conducted the search—244 reported cases made
such a reference.185 This many references, mainly at the appellate level,
confirm that, however doubtful the doctrine may be on paper, prima facie
tort is alive and well in the hearts and minds of plaintiffs’ lawyers.
III. THE FUTURE OF LIABILITY FOR INTANGIBLE HARM
There can be no question that we have entered a post-industrial era,
in which information, rather than things themselves, is playing and will
continue to play an increasingly important role in our economy and in
our social lives. New forms of harm—either caused by intangible
forces, involving intangible loss, 186 or both—are emerging and will
undoubtedly be more prevalent as the information age proceeds. For
these new forms of harm to result in the creation of new torts, or the
expansion of existing torts, they will have to satisfy the preconditions
182. See, e.g., Beren v. Ropfogel, 24 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 1994) (tortious
interference with inheritance); Willard v. Caterpillar, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 607, 616
(1995) (spoliation of evidence).
183. See, e.g., Taylor v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 957 A.2d 45, 50 (D.C. 2008)
(physical and emotional mistreatment of an employee); Doe v. Roe, 598 N.Y.S.2d 678,
680 (Just. Ct. Rockland Cty. 1993) (intentional transmission of venereal disease).
184. The search was conducted on Westlaw using the search terms “prima facie tort”
on August 21, 2018.
185. The search was conducted on Westlaw using the search terms “prima facie tort”
on August 21, 2018.
186. As we noted at the outset, see supra note 5, we use the term “intangible” to
denote loss falling outside the classic contours of damages for bodily injury and
property damage. We include pure economic loss in that category when it is caused
by an intangible force such as digital hacking.
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to creation of new torts that we identified in Part I. In addition, the
saga of the residual category of liability approach that we explored in
Part II strongly suggests that any new liability will take the form of
particular, named torts.
Predicting the exact nature of the intangible harms that have not yet
occurred or even been imagined would, of course, be a fruitless
venture. Even just a few years ago, almost no one would have predicted
that misuse of Facebook data would have influenced the 2016 election
for president of the United States, or that a series of prominent men
holding powerful media positions would lose their jobs as a result of
their sexual misconduct. We will not attempt to envision a future that
may be stranger than fiction.
Nonetheless, we are struck by certain parallels between the last
period of great turmoil in tort law and what may well be about to occur.
Between about 1960 and 1985, the physical harms of the late industrial
age generated new tort liabilities to meet them. 187 Early in this period,
injuries caused by durable consumer products—cars, power tools, and
appliances—became the subject of much greater concern than in the
past, and liability for defects in the design of such products emerged. 188
At roughly the same time, the pharmaceutical revolution produced
marvelous and powerful new drugs, but the drugs sometimes were sold
with inadequate warnings about the side effects that the drugs could
cause. 189 Liability in tort for failure to warn of those side effects
emerged. 190 In addition, automobile accidents had, by this time,
become a significant enough social problem that, in a number of
states, no-fault auto insurance was partially substituted for tort liability
for auto-related bodily injuries. 191 Then, late in the period came the
discovery that the industrial activity of the prior decades was
responsible for a deposit of leaking hazardous waste at thousands of
sites, posing a danger to health and the environment. 192 A federal

187. See e.g., William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 791–94 (1966) (discussing the impact of industrialization on the
development of products liability law).
188. Id. at 791.
189. Id. at 808.
190. Id.
191. See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 287–94.
192. See Richard E. Lotz, Liability Issues Under CERCLA, 23 A.F. L. REV. 370, 370–71
(1982) (“Senator Randolph stated the study had ‘found that 1100 disposal sites,
holding about 100 million tons of chemical wastes, had been used by the Nation’s 53
largest chemical companies, since 1950 without any regulatory control.’”).
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regime imposing civil liability for the cost of cleanup of these sites was
enacted. 193 Similar state regimes also were adopted. 194
We may well be at the beginning of an analogous period in our
history. In the past few decades, the cyber revolution has spawned
forms of activity that simply did not exist in the past. Like the products
and pharmaceutical revolutions, the cyber revolution has yielded
enormous, unforeseen benefits. And like the prior revolutions, the
cyber revolution has initially taken place largely without legal
regulation and without much influence by the law of torts. Several
decades into the revolution, however, cyber wrongdoing and the
harms that it can cause are becoming increasingly evident. 195 The same
kind of cultural pressure that led to the modernization of tort liability
for physical forces and physical harm more than fifty years ago may
now be starting to develop in the context of the intangible forces and
intangible harms of the digital world.
A slightly different, but related state of affairs may be emerging in
another social sphere. Harms caused by sexual misconduct have long
been understood to occur regularly, and both statutory and common
law liabilities have long been available to redress harms involving
sexual misconduct. But it has become obvious in just the last few years
that those harms have been even more widespread than some people
had previously recognized. The legal regimes designed not only to
compensate for such harms, but also to deter them from occurring, have in
many respects failed at that task.196 In contrast to cyber misconduct and in
connection with harms involving sexual misconduct, we need not speculate
about whether cultural pressure to better address the harms this
misconduct causes will develop. That pressure exists, and those kinds of
harms already have high social salience.
We are not prescient enough to predict in detail how either of those
radically new developments and the harms that accompany them will
193. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75 (2012).
194. See, e.g., Kimberly Bick, Contaminated Groundwater as a Resource in California,
HASTINGS ENVTL. L.J. 97, 105–06 (“In California, the analog to CERCLA is the
Hazardous Substance Account Act (HSAA) . . . .”).
195. See, e.g., In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.,
834 F. Supp. 2d 566 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (allowing a class action lawsuit against a payment
transaction company after its computer systems were compromised by hackers), rev’d
in part, Lone Star Nat’l Bank v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 729 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 2013).
196. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF
INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW ix–x (1998); John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni,
“No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure of the “Non-Consent” Reform Movement in American Rape
and Sexual Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1082 (2011).
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play out in tort law over the long term. But given our aims here, that
is not necessary. What we can do is sketch out the implications of the
considerations we have already identified, in connection with the
creation of new torts, for the potential development of tort liability for
intangible harms with high social salience. In order to do this, we focus
on three kinds of intangible harms that have already occurred and that
can be expected to occur with considerably more frequency or to be
the subject of greater scrutiny in the future. These intangible harms
include: consumer credit losses resulting from digital hacking; the
unauthorized publication of medical or other private information
obtained from confidential websites; and sexualized misconduct that
does not involve or pose the threat of imminent bodily contact.
We have singled out those harms for discussion because they
currently have high social salience. The hacking of credit accounts has
become a nearly ubiquitous phenomenon, and typically, consumers
are protected against losses through arrangements with the banks that
issue credit cards or otherwise support accounts. 197 But in addition to
the hacking of credit accounts, massive data breaches of large
enterprises, including hospitals and universities, have resulted in large
amounts of private information being compromised. 198 Some social
websites also have inadvertently released to third parties the
information supplied by their subscribers—information that was
intended to be limited to a circumscribed group of other
subscribers. 199 Finally, the MeToo movement has generated a large
197. For recent examples of major data breaches, see Vindu Goel & Rachel Abrams,
Hackers Stole Data from Millions of Cards at Saks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2018, at B2; Tara
Siegel Bernard et al., Equifax Attack Exposes Data of 143 Million, N.Y. TIMES, September
8, 2017, at A1, A20. One 2017 survey stated that “46% of Americans have been victim
to credit card fraud in the past 5 years.” Rebecca Lake, 23 Frightening Credit Fraud Card
Statistics, CREDIT DONKEY (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.creditdonkey.com/credit-cardfraud-statistics.html [https://perma.cc/3U92-S5H8].
Consumers’ exposure to
liability for unauthorized transactions on their credit cards is generally limited by
federal law. See John S. Kiernan, Credit Card & Debit Card Fraud Statistics, WALLET HUB
(Feb. 17, 2017), https://wallethub.com/edu/credit-debit-card-fraud-statistics/25725
[https://perma.cc/BPW5-4RUQ].
198. See, e.g., Henry K. Lee, Hackers Tap Thousands of Students’ Key Records, S.F.
CHRONICLE, May 9, 2009, at B1; Nate Lord, Top 10 Biggest Healthcare Data Breaches of All
Time, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (June 25, 2018), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/top-10biggest-healthcare-data-breaches-all-time [https://perma.cc/P43Z-4XPB]; Nicole
Perlroth, Hospital Company Hacked, Affecting 4.5 Million Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
2014, at B4.
199. See, e.g., Gerry Shih, Facebook Admits Year-Long Data Breach Exposed 6 Million Users,
REUTERS (June 21, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/net-us-facebook-security
[https://perma.cc/WA7B-54ZU]. Facebook also releases vast amounts of private
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amount of publicity for inappropriate sexualized behavior, primarily
directed at females by males, that does not come within the definitions
of assault, battery, or statutory sexual harassment. 200 All of those
activities have generated widespread negative reactions: they amount
to perceived “social wrongs” with ample normative weight.
Those intangible harms are, no doubt, the proverbial tip of the
iceberg. The unexpected sharing of digital data by one source with
another—think of Google’s sharing of consumer shopping data with
other vendors, under terms of use that arguably “authorize” Google to
do so 201—also may eventually lead to tort litigation. The casual quip
that a smartphone is a surveillance device that also permits
communication directs our attention to the possibility of future suits
over unauthorized surveillance of personal devices. 202 Our analyses of
the three kinds of harms on which we do focus are primarily intended
to serve as illustrations of the manner in which courts in the future may
go about addressing new types of tort claims involving intangible losses.
The message of Parts I and II was that residual categories of liability
are abstractions, maintained only before the imposition of liability
under particular circumstances becomes a live possibility. At that
point, if a claim is successful, it is either assimilated into an existing,
possibly expanded tort, or a new, but contained and limited tort is
created. Nothing stays for long in the residual category. For this
reason, we doubt very much that there will ever be a residual category
of liability consisting of something like “invasion of data privacy.”
Similarly, in our view, there will never be a residual category of tort
liability for sexual misconduct. The question will be whether forms of
what has been called “sexualized misconduct” 203 that do not currently
fall within the confines of one or more of the existing torts will
continue not to be actionable in the future, or instead, will result in
the expansion of an existing tort or the creation of a new tort or torts

information by design. Gabriel J.X. Dance et al., Device Companies Have Vast Access to
Facebook Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2018, at A1, A13.
200. See infra Section III.C (discussing consequences for inappropriate sexual behavior).
201. See, e.g., Charles Arthur, Google Raises Privacy Fears as Personal Details Are Released
to App Developers, GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2013/feb/25/google-privacy-fears-app-developers [https://perma.cc/
9QCN-7Y35].
202. Scott Rosenburg, Your Phone is also a Surveillance Device, and It’s Turning Your
Life into a Map, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.insider.com/yourphone-is-also-a-surveillance-device [https://perma.cc/C234-488Z].
203. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM
22, 27 (2018).
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that would permit the imposition of liability for intangible harms not
actionable at present.
A. Negligent Release of Hacked Consumer Credit Information
There are almost weekly reports of the hacking of consumer credit
and other data maintained by businesses with whom consumers deal.
In most instances, the consumers whose information is obtained are
protected by contract against direct losses resulting from fraudulent
charges made on their accounts.204 However, by contract, the banks issuing
credit cards, which are used by hackers or their successors to make
fraudulent charges on credit card accounts, must pay those charges.205 In
addition, consumers whose information is wrongfully obtained may suffer
other losses caused by the misuse of the information, the most salient of
which is identity theft.206 We discuss below both the banks’ and the
consumers’ potential causes of action for their losses.
1.

The issuing banks’ losses
To date, the principal issue in banks’ negligence suits against
merchants and others whose data reservoirs have been hacked has
been whether the “economic loss rule” applies. 207 This is the general
rule that there is no liability in negligence for pure economic loss, 208
and the particular application of this rule to instances in which the
parties have contracted, or had the potential to contract, regarding
liability for such losses.
Legal scholarship about those suits has identified a number of
considerations which might bear on their treatment. 209 None of this
writing, however, has recognized the consideration that we identified
in Part I as being central to the creation of new torts: the wrong to the
issuing banks has little social salience or normative weight. The
204. See 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (2012) (limiting liability of card holders); 12 C.F.R. § 12
(2018) (same). These consumers may nonetheless have indirect or consequential
losses, resulting from the inconvenience of setting up new accounts and the possible
short-term lack of access to credit while new accounts are established.
205. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Can Data Breach Claims Survive the Economic Loss Rule?,
66 DEPAUL L. REV. 339, 346 (2017) (“Privity thus exists between the issuer bank and the
payment card network, as well as between the acquirer bank and the payment card network.”).
206. U.S. GAO, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, DATA BREACHES, RANGE OF
CONSUMER RISKS HIGHLIGHTS LIMITATIONS OF IDENTITY THEFT SERVICES (Mar. 2019).
207. See Sharkey, supra note 205, at 346.
208. See id.
209. See generally The Twenty-Second Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social
Policy: Privacy, Data Theft and Corporate Responsibility, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 311 (2017)
(introducing several articles on tort law and social policy).
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merchants’ failure to protect consumers’ data is highly blameworthy,
but the principal wrong is to the consumers whose data they failed to
protect, not to the issuing banks. There is no cultural pressure to afford
the banks a right of recovery in this situation. Most people do not consider
whether banks might have such a right, and if they did, they would likely
think that the banks have no one to blame but themselves for their losses,
since they could have protected themselves by contract. The banks are
strategically placed to enter into contractual arrangements with merchants
and possibly even with consumers, limiting their exposure to consumer
losses suffered when merchant data reservoirs are hacked, but, for
whatever reasons, do not seem to have not done so. 210 As a
consequence, we do not anticipate the expansion of existing forms of
tort liability, or the creation of a new tort, to address the issuing banks’
losses in this situation.
2.

Consumer losses
The situation of banks issuing credit cards is obviously not the same
as that of consumers whose data is hacked. Although consumers are
protected against direct losses on their stolen credit card accounts,
they are vulnerable to other misuses of their stolen data. In principle,
consumers’ potential claims against the negligent merchants who
stored now-hacked data might be subject to the economic loss rule.
Consumers may or may not be in privity of contract with those
merchants, 211 but if they are, contracts between the two could address
potential economic losses resulting from the merchants’ negligence.
On the other hand, contracts between consumers and merchants are
boilerplate contracts, whose terms arguably should have less binding
force than those between the merchants and issuing banks. From a
normative standpoint, the merchants’ wrongdoing is often serious.
Consumer data has been entrusted to those merchants; they know or
should know that there is a substantial risk that their customers will
suffer losses beyond their existing credit accounts if the security of
210. The banks are not in direct privity with the merchants but are in indirect privity
by virtue of the membership in the Visa or MasterCard networks that contract with the
merchants. See Sharkey, supra note 205, at 361–62. With respect to contracts between
banks and consumers, Mark Geistfeld suggests that whether the economic loss rule
applies in data breach cases will typically turn on whether a consumer has sufficient
information to protect his or her confidential information by contracting with a
business over reasonable security for that data. Mark A. Geistfeld, Protecting Confidential
Information Entrusted to Others in Business Transactions: Data Breaches, Identity Theft, and
Tort Liability, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 385, 394 (2017).
211. Sharkey, supra note 205, at 346 (suggesting that privity of contract does not
“always exist between consumer credit card holders and merchants”).

2132

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:2089

their data is not maintained, and they know that there is a significant
threat that hackers will attempt to obtain the data. A failure to exercise
reasonable care to protect the data under these circumstances is highly
blameworthy. Interestingly, however, there does not seem to be much
cultural pressure to afford a remedy for such negligence. In our
experience, most people who are notified that their data has been
hacked appear to be satisfied once they have been reimbursed for any
authorized use of credit cards, if they are given a free year or two of
membership in a credit and identity protection service by the
merchant in question.
In addition, there are justiciability issues that may adversely affect
efforts to establish a new tort governing liability for this type of harm.
First, developing standards to define what constitutes reasonable care
in the maintenance and protection of consumer data could be a
challenge. Some of the highly publicized data breaches in recent years
seem particularly egregious and sloppy, 212 but not all will be. And there
will possibly be vexing causation questions since hackers may well be
capable of overcoming even reasonable efforts at protecting consumer
data, in which instances a merchant’s negligence may not necessarily
be a cause of the breach.
Second, consumers’ damages from identity theft resulting from data
breaches may lie at the margin of cognizability. One of the reasons for
the economic loss rule is the difficulty of tracing the economic effects
of negligent behavior. 213 Consumers’ immediate losses from data
breach—e.g., the cost of establishing new accounts and of disputing
charges made on a new, fraudulently-obtained credit card—may be
cognizable (though small), but the ripple effects of other
disruptions suffered by the party in question may be harder to
trace. This difficulty may be aggravated when the consequences of
identity theft are not recognized or manifested until a
considerable period after the theft actually occurs.
Consumers may suffer other losses, however, upon learning that
their data, and therefore their identities, may have been compromised.
They may worry about what may occur in the future, for example, if
their identity is not merely stolen in bulk with the identities of others,
but actually compromised. The analogy to fear of future bodily injury
is suggestive, but not dispositive. Except under unusual circumstances,
fear of experiencing bodily injury or disease in the future is not
212. See, e.g., Julie Creswell & Nicole Perlroth, Ex-Employees Say Home Depot Left Data
Vulnerable, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2014, at A1, B2.
213. See Sharkey, supra note 205, at 334 n.13.
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compensable in tort until some tangible injury has occurred. 214 This
makes sense on several grounds, not the least of which is concern for
avoiding multiple law suits: the first, for fear of injury and the second,
for actual injury if it later materializes. 215 Data theft may seem closer
to constituting an actual loss—perhaps analogous to the theft of
property—than to being exposed to the pure risk of suffering harm in
the future, but we think the same difficulties with recovery for
emotional harm before any tangible harm occurs are presented when
someone becomes anxious about the future release of private
information that might compromise his or her identity.
Finally, as a practical matter, both the financial and emotional losses
of most victims are likely to be comparatively small, but the sum total
of such losses suffered by hundreds of thousands of victims (or more)
may be enormous. One of the other justifications for the economic
loss rule is that liability for pure economic loss would impose catastrophic
liability of this sort on a single party, whereas the absence of liability
spreads a series of comparatively small losses among a large number of
victims, who can insure against or mitigate their losses more effectively. 216
In light of all these considerations, we suspect there will be no tort
liability for what might be termed the “ordinary” financial and
emotional losses associated with credit data breaches and resulting
identity thefts. Rather, we think that tort liability for those losses will
be limited to those who suffer unusual emotional loss beyond what the
reasonable person would be expected to suffer,217 or demonstrable out-ofpocket financial loss, analogous to special damages that must sometimes be
proved in order to recover for loss caused by defamation. A plaintiff will
have to have suffered losses different in kind or magnitude from what other
victims suffered in order to have a right to recover for them.

214. See, e.g., Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 426–27 (1997)
(disallowing a claim alleging fear of cancer resulting from exposure to asbestos).
215. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 47 cmt. k. (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
216. See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 278.
217. There is an analogy here to the requirement some jurisdictions apply in suits
involving negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from witnessing the death
of another person: the plaintiff must suffer distress beyond that which would have
been experienced by a disinterested party. See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814,
815 (Cal. 1989) (holding that only a person closely related to a victim, present at the
scene of the accident, and suffering a harm, could recover for negligent infliction of
emotional distress).
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B. Negligent Release of Confidential Personal Information
Massive amounts of medical and other confidential information are now
maintained in digital form. Much of this information is insecure and
vulnerable to breaches of confidentiality. To give just two examples, the
health insurer Anthem218 and the marital dating site Ashley Madison both
have been hacked,219 and the identity of some of the individuals registered
on the latter were released. 220 Here, the principal, and often exclusive,
harm to the individuals in question is the invasion, or potential invasion,
of their privacy with its attendant consequences, including possible or
actual identity theft.
Such harms fall within the potential gravitational pull of two of the
interests protected by the existing privacy torts, intrusion on seclusion
and public disclosure of true private facts. We predict that liability will
be imposed for some but not all of the harm involved, and that this will
be accomplished by a hybrid approach. First, there will be no liability
for intrusion itself. Second, liability for release of private or
confidential information will be assimilated into the existing cause of
action for public disclosure, in the sense that the new liability will be
for invasion of the same interest that is already protected by this tort.
But this tort currently requires the defendant to intend to invade the
plaintiff’s privacy. 221 The new tort will be actionable even in the
absence of intent if the defendant has been negligent in failing to
protect the plaintiff’s privacy.
1.

Data breach itself
The first type of harm involved in breaches of this sort is the
invasion itself. The possible analogy between this kind of invasion of
private data, and intrusion on seclusion through such means as
eavesdropping or visual spying, is evident. In each instance, a party
without the right to do so gains access to something highly private or
confidential. Intrusion on seclusion is actionable even in the absence

218. See In re Anthem Inc. Data Breach Litig., 162 F. Supp. 3d 953, 1016 (N.D. Cal.
2016) (allowing Anthem policy holders to sue Anthem for data breach but requiring
dismissal of all non-anthem policy holders); Reed Abelson & Matthew Goldstein,
Hackers Breached Data of Millions, Insurer Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2015, at B1.
219. See Dino Grandoni, Ashley Madison, a Website for Straying Spouses, Is Hit by an
Online Attack, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2015, at B3.
220. Id.
221. See Koeppel v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177, 178 (Iowa 2011) (quoting Stessman v.
Am. Black Hawk Broad. Co., 416 N.W.2d 685, 686 (Iowa 1987)) (“We have held that
an intrusion upon seclusion occurs when a person ‘intentionally intrudes, physically or
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another . . . .’”).
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of a showing that an individual witnessed what was secluded. 222
Recording an intimate conversation, for example, would be actionable
even without proof that anyone listened to the recording. 223 Clearly,
the core of the wrong in the invasion of private data, however, is not
the fact of intrusion itself but the combination of intrusion and the fact
that someone listened to or saw what was intruded upon. The core of
the wrong lies in something private being witnessed.
Consequently, the mere hacking of private or confidential
information lies outside the core of the tort of intrusion on seclusion.
Conventional intrusions on seclusion usually involve a single victim or
only a few victims. 224 Even without proof that the tortfeasor actually
listened to or witnessed what was intruded upon, there is often a
substantial possibility, perhaps even a de facto presumption, that this
occurred. Moreover, at least part of the outrage victims reasonably feel
upon learning of an intrusion is often that a particular, identified
individual may have actually witnessed them in a private or intimate
setting. That is emphatically not what occurs with mass digital
intrusions in which a wrongdoer gains access to medical or other
private information about tens or hundreds of thousands of
individuals. Victims have no reason to imagine that anyone, let alone
a particular individual, actually has gained personal knowledge of the
information in question merely by virtue of successful hacking. On the
contrary, victims’ legitimate concern is not about the fact of hacking
alone, but that the hacking will lead to disclosure of the information
to third parties.
In this situation, we think that the courts would neither impose
liability for intrusion on seclusion nor create a new tort to govern
liability for such an intrusion. The emotional harm that victims suffer
from merely knowing that their private information is no longer safely

222. See id. at 181 (noting that there are only two elements of invasion of privacy:
invading where plaintiff “has a right to expect privacy” and in a manner “highly
offensive to a reasonable person”).
223. See id. at 178 (holding that installation of a non-functional camera to view
female employees was actionable).
224. Most of the prominent seclusion cases involve only a single victim or a small
number of victims. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 991 (2d Cir. 1973) (one
victim); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (one victim);
Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 475 (Cal. 1998) (two victims); Nader v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 767 (N.Y. 1970) (one victim). See generally David
Bender, A Guide to Cyberlaw and Data Privacy Law, 5 COMP. LAW Sect. 41 (2018)
(summarizing additional cases).
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maintained is real, but, in most cases, likely to be minimal and difficult
to quantify; this harm is not easily cognizable. 225
2.

Public disclosure
In contrast to the mismatch between hacking and intrusion on seclusion,
the actual release of improperly obtained confidential digital information
resembles the harm that is addressed by the tort of public disclosure of true
private facts. Much, and arguably all, of an individual’s medical
information is sufficiently personal, even if its release does not reveal
anything embarrassing, to satisfy the element of this tort requiring that the
disclosure be “highly offensive” to the reasonable person.226
Moreover, the damages that result from such disclosure will be of the same
order as those that plaintiffs suffer in more conventional cases of public
disclosure—embarrassment, anxiety, and the like. Although damages for
such losses may be difficult to quantify, tort law has already determined that
they are sufficiently cognizable to warrant being awarded.227
However, the courts will have to surmount a different, substantial
barrier to adopting liability for the release of this form of information.
Currently, there is no liability in negligence for public disclosure of
true private facts. 228 The tort requires an intent to disclose. Although
there may be occasions on which a defendant deliberately publicizes
private information that it maintains in digital form, much more
frequently, the disclosure will result from invasion by an unknown
hacker, and the defendant ordinarily will be an entity whose alleged
negligence made the hacking possible.
Adopting a tort of negligent failure to protect against public disclosure
of true private facts would, no doubt, be a major expansion of liability.
Some courts will refuse to take such action. But if the disclosure of private
information from hacking becomes common and widespread, and there is
no statutory or regulatory regime rigorously deterring negligent failure to
provide adequate data security by imposing severe penalties for
225. But see Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of
Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 737–38 (2018) (arguing that the harm is
cognizable and demonstrating how courts could use existing precedent to “assess risk
and anxiety in a concrete and coherent way”).
226. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
227. See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975) (allowing damages
for releasing private information “when the publicity ceases to be the giving of
information . . . and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives”).
228. We have been unable to find an authoritative statement to this effect, but we
also have not been able to identify any cases in which liability was imposed for
negligent disclosure. We are therefore confident that the assertion we make in the
text is the law on this issue.
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violations,229 then eventually, some courts will expressly or impliedly
recognize that the tort, under some circumstances, satisfies the criteria we
identified in Part I. There has been enough attention paid to data security
breaches, and enough public concern about them, that the failure to
maintain adequate cyber security is a matter of increasing social salience.
Negligent failure to do so is widely regarded as blameworthy and will be
regarded as especially blameworthy in cases involving embarrassing or
other confidential facts.
The kinds of disclosures that have occurred thus far involve such
facts as medical data on tens of thousands of individuals.230 The liability
faced by an allegedly negligent defendant would be catastrophic in
magnitude. As we noted earlier, this prospect is one of the considerations
that underlies the economic loss rule. Imposing liability focuses an
enormous cost on a single party, whereas denying liability spreads a large
number of small losses among victims who have the potential to buy
health, disability, property, and business interruption insurance against
them. 231 In contrast to economic losses incurred by victims of data
breaches, however, emotional losses from public disclosure of
confidential information will be much more difficult for potential
victims to insure against. There is no prospect that such insurance will
become available any time soon, and we doubt that such insurance will
ever be feasible. There has never even been a separate market for firstparty insurance against pain and suffering associated with physical
injury, for example, despite the fact that such loss is likely to be more
easily quantified than embarrassment associated with disclosure of
private information. 232
229. There are at least a dozen federal statutes addressing data security, but they
obviously have not deterred the many data breaches that have occurred in the past few
years. Some are probably obsolete, given technological advances. See, e.g., Financial
Services Modernization Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–02 (2012) (regulating the
confidentiality of financial institutions’ consumer information); Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (regulating computer tampering); Video Privacy
Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (regulating the disclosure of private audio
and visual rental and purchase records); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of
1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (regulating the privacy of educational records); Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1320d-9
(regulating identifiable health information).
230. See, e.g., Abelson & Goldstein, supra note 218.
231. See Ward Farnsworth, The Economic Loss Rule, 50 VAL. UNIV. L. REV. 545, 555 (2016).
232. For discussion, see ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 246; Steven P. Croley & Jon D.
Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1790 (1995) (“[F]rom purely an insurance perspective, consumers
would prefer not to receive pain-and-suffering damages at all.”); Alan Schwartz,
Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 364 (1988).
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Taking all these considerations into account, we predict that, in contrast
to what we suggested would be considerable judicial reluctance to
recognize broad liability for economic loss resulting from data breaches, a
limited cause of action for public disclosure of confidential digital
information will be recognized. We think that, at least initially, successful
actions will be restricted to cases in which comparatively small groups of
victims have suffered distinctive and severe forms of harm. We make this
suggestion based on the criteria set forth in Part I. Violations resulting
in distinctive and severe forms of harm are likely to foster high social
salience and normative weight. The small size of the victim group
serves as a counter to the fear of potentially unlimited liability, making
such cases more cognizable. And the cognizability of such cases makes
it more likely that lawyers will consider bringing them.
Thus, health insurers and others who maintain individuals’ medical
data, as well as dating or similar websites as to which the mere fact of
participation is confidential, will simply have to recognize the enormous
potential liability they face if they do not maintain reasonable security
against hacking. They may find it in their interest to purchase substantial
amounts of insurance against such liability in the same manner that major
corporations now purchase hundreds of millions of dollars of insurance
against liability for bodily injury and property damage.233
For companies such as Anthem and other leading health insurers,
this is a feasible approach. We suspect, however, that the major
consequence for smaller companies such as Ashley Madison will be
bankruptcy, and, thus, only limited, if any, compensation will be granted for
the victims of such disclosures.”234 That is a prospect of which users of
confidential social websites should be aware.
C. Intentional and Negligent Sexualized Misconduct
The much-heightened scrutiny of sexual misconduct that has
occurred over the last several years will undoubtedly trigger liabilities
that fall into a number of already existing common law and statutory
categories: the common law torts of assault, battery, and IIED, as well
as statutory liability for creation of a hostile work environment, among
others. Another form of misconduct, however, falls outside those
categories in many instances. In order to distinguish this misconduct
from conduct that is actionable under existing forms of liability—but
233. Judy Greenwald, Cyber Insurance Policies Vary Widely and Require Close Scrutiny,
BUS. INS. (May 10, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article
/00010101/NEWS06/305109992 [https://perma.cc/84UH-HFM9].
234. See Grandoni, supra note 219, at B3.
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not to diminish in any way the significance of either form of
misconduct—we call the currently-not-actionable forms of behavior
“sexualized” (rather than “sexual”) misconduct. 235
This form of misconduct is not easy to define with precision because
it takes many forms. To speak in the vernacular, this is creepy (or
worse) conduct, usually by males, that has sexual connotations or
overtones. Often, the conduct is verbal only, consisting of references
to another person’s appearance or attractiveness, or another’s conduct
with others. It may also consist of requests for social interaction that
are clearly not welcomed but continue to occur.
The courts would have to create a new tort for this kind of conduct
if the harm that it causes were to be actionable. From a normative
standpoint, the conduct probably qualifies. Admittedly, it is the kind
of conduct at which many people in the past merely rolled their eyes
or complained to their friends about and then ignored. But new and
higher standards of social interaction have resulted in such conduct
being perceived as more objectionable to a much larger percentage of
the population than it was in the past. 236 More egregious, already
tortious conduct uncovered by the MeToo movement has rendered
this currently non-tortious conduct more salient, and more widely
understood to be improper, than previously. 237 The cultural pressure
necessary to support the imposition for liability for this conduct
certainly is present in a way that it was not even a few years ago.
On the other hand, tort law has refrained over a long period from
imposing liability for similarly objectionable, but non-sexualized,
misconduct. The tort of IIED, for example, requires that conduct
intended to cause emotional distress be “extreme and outrageous,” 238
partly on the ground that everyone must learn to live with a certain
amount of offensive conduct from others, 239 and that the expensive
machinery of tort law should not be invoked until the conduct is more
235. See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2064 (2003)
(arguing against legal standards that attempt to banish sexuality from the workplace).
236. See Kristen N. Coletta, Sexual Harassment on Social Media: Why Traditional
Company Sexual Harassment Policies Are Not Enough and How to Fix It, 48 SETON HALL L.
REV. 449, 450 (2018); Jessica Fink, Gender Sidelining and the Problem of Unactionable
Discrimination, 29 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 57, 62 (2018); Kevin Gomez et al., State
Regulation of Sexual Harassment, 18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 815, 829–30 n.85 (2017); Ramit
Mizrahi, Sexual Harassment After #Metoo: Looking to California as a Model, 128 YALE L.J.
FORUM 121, 127 (2018).
237. Schultz, supra note 203, at 31–32, 32 n.27.
238. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
239. See W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 59 (5th
ed. 1984) (noting that “[l]iability of course cannot be extended to every indignity”).
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than merely offensive.
Much of the objectionable sexualized
misconduct that we have in mind is offensive, but arguably, it is not
always necessarily “extreme and outrageous,” as Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 46 has indicated. 240 Moreover, there is a difference
between unintentional or unconscious microaggressions and conduct
that the defendant intends to cause serious discomfort or knows will
do so. That distinction would have to be drawn in a way that makes it
operational.
In our view, however, the damages that could be awarded for
engaging in sexualized misconduct would be cognizable, perhaps on
the model of what happens in cases where IIED is actionable. And it
is possible that the ordinary practical obstacles to bringing suit for
sexualized misconduct could be overcome. Most lawyers would not
take most cases on a contingency fee basis because the amount of
damages likely to be awarded would often be small. We can picture
some plaintiffs nonetheless being willing to pay lawyers an hourly fee
to sue on their behalf even when the prospect of recovering more than
$5,000, for example, would be small. There might not be many such
suits, but it might not take very many to send potential violators a
strong message.
But there would be two challenges. First, it would be difficult to
articulate discrete and limited standards governing liability. “I know it
when I see it” would be inadequate, not only because that standard is
vague, but because the question would also have to be whether the
defendant knew “it” when he did “it.” For this reason, sexualized
misconduct that received an explicit negative reaction and then was
repeated might have to be required. If this were the case, the tort
would effectively be for a pattern of sexualized misconduct, except
when no reasonable person could think that the first act was
acceptable, in which case a single instance would be actionable.
An important (though non-exclusive) source for rendering the new
liability standard discrete might be the rules governing what
constitutes a “hostile work environment” under Title VII of the federal
Civil Rights Act. 241 Sexual harassment in the workplace has taken
various forms that would often be equally objectionable in nonworkplace settings: leering at a woman and offering her money to
engage in sexual intercourse; 242 repeatedly asking a woman to “do

240. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46.
241. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2012).
242. Robson v. Eva’s Super Mkt., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 857, 859 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
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something nice for [me];” 243 making demeaning sexual inquiries; 244
and making sexual references to parts of the plaintiff’s body. 245 The
making of sexual jokes, negative remarks about people of a particular
gender or sexual orientation, displaying sexual material or pictures,
sending inappropriate emails or other forms of communication,
scapegoating, and name calling, for example, could also easily
qualify. 246 Some such conduct might be more objectionable in the
workplace than outside of it, depending, among other things, on how
free the victim is to avoid the individual who engages or attempts to
engage in objectionable conduct. But the Title VII analogy is a good
starting point for making the standard of liability concrete.
Second, there would be a risk that the threat of liability for sexualized
misconduct might have a chilling effect on tolerable social interaction. It
may be even less desirable for the law to risk promoting sexually “sanitized”
social interactions than promoting sexual sanitization of the workplace.247
In addition, because sexualized misconduct would not be tortious in the
absence of a defendant’s knowledge that it was offensive or his intent that
it be offensive, insurance against this form of liability would be either
unavailable or against public policy, on the ground that it created excessive
moral hazard.248 The anticipated self-insured costs of defense even in cases
that were not successful could be significant for defendants.249
The consequence might be that, for all but the most egregious and
judgment-proof individuals, refraining from engaging in conduct that
plausibly could be alleged, even unsuccessfully, to constitute
sexualized misconduct would be the wisest course for most people. We
might even move slightly more toward the kinds of more formal
interactions between individuals that characterized upper-class
relationships in the nineteenth century. 250 For many women, that
might be preferable to what they have been forced to tolerate over the
243. Coley v. Consol. Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645, 647 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
244. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d. 897, 899 (11th Cir. 1982).
245. E.E.O.C. v. Int’l Profit Ass’n, 647 F. Supp. 2d 951, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
246. For discussion, see supra note 236 and accompanying text.
247. See Schultz, supra note 203, at 24.
248. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 96–97 (6th ed. 2015) (indicating that most courts hold that
insurance against liability for intentional wrongdoing violates public policy).
249. Most liability insurance policies cover both indemnity and the costs of defense,
but included the latter only when incurred to defend a suit that would be covered by
the policy if the allegations were true. See id. at 577.
250. See generally 18th Century Etiquette & Expectations, LOVERS & LIARS,
https://loversandliarsmedley.wordpress.com/about/a-dramaturgs-perspective/18thcentury-ettiquette-expectations [https://perma.cc/G5Q3-88G6].
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course of their lives. But in the parlance of tort theory, in an effort to
obtain desirable, safety-level effects, the threat of liability might
generate arguably sub-optimal, activity-level effects. 251
Finally, as referenced by the essentiality criterion we developed in
Part I, other sources of relief sometimes are available and sometimes
are not in this area. Employers have some liability for creating or
knowingly tolerating a hostile work environment. Even in instances in
which there would be no such liability, adverse publicity recently has
produced firings and suspensions of prominent individuals who might
be defendants if a new form of tort were created, for example. 252 Antiharassment statutes are available in some jurisdictions to enjoin the
more egregious forms of misconduct (sexualized or not) that involve
physical proximity,253 phone calling, or other vexatious communications.
But much of the misconduct we have in mind does not readily fit
into existing categories of common law tort liability or statutory antidiscrimination law. Imagine the sort of encounter, now commonly
recounted by participants in the MeToo movement, in which a male
occupying some sort of authoritative position in an industry or a
corporate enterprise—a movie producer or a senior executive—invites
a junior female in that industry or enterprise who is not his employee—
an aspiring actress or a colleague from another company—to his
residence, purportedly to discuss a role in a forthcoming film or to
offer career advice. In the process, the male engages in sexualized
behavior toward the female—sitting uncomfortably close to her,
making remarks about her appearance, or calling attention to his own
physical characteristics that stops short of an assault or intentional
infliction of emotional distress, but that in a formal workplace setting
involving an employee, might qualify as sexual harassment. Tort law,
as presently constituted, provides no remedy for that sort of behavior
in that setting, and Title VII does not apply.
In the past, a warning visit to the culprit from the police, or from a
member of the victim’s family, might have been available to some
victims of sexualized misconduct and might have been effective. This kind
of self-help still may occur sporadically. Courts know about those other
251. See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1980)
(discussing the distinction between safety-level and activity-level effects).
252. See, e.g., ‘Extra’ Host A.J. Calloway Suspended Following Sexual Assault Allegations,
(Feb. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/09/arts/television/aj-callowaysuspended-extra.html [https://perma.cc/5R8R-CLAT].
253. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 987, 991 (2d Cir. 1973) (applying an
anti-harassment statute to a suit by Jaqueline Kennedy Onassis against photographer
who stalked her and her children).
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possible sources of relief, although they also know that relief of those sorts
is likely only to be sporadically available and only to some victims. And of
course, the courts know that even when those sources of relief prevent
future offensive conduct, they do nothing to compensate victims for the
losses they have already experienced.
In view of this analysis, we are uncertain about the future of potential
tort liability for harm caused by sexualized misconduct. The courts
might decide, reluctantly, to refrain from entering the field and refuse
to recognize liability for conduct that falls outside the confines of the
existing torts. Or the courts might begin, as they did with negligent
infliction of emotional distress,254 by permitting the imposition of liability
in a core set of especially appealing cases, without initially articulating the
limits and standards governing other conduct lying further from the core,
but eventually doing so as more new cases are brought.
Which path is taken may well depend on how developments in our
culture evolve beyond where they are at present. The MeToo movement
marks the beginning of a new cultural moment, not the end of one. On
this score, the one thing our analysis leads us to be confident about is
that if liability is imposed, it will not take long for the courts to
recognize that it is not a reflection of a residual category of liability,
but the introduction of a new tort.
CONCLUSION
We began this Article asking how torts come into being and identifying
a set of factors that serve as preconditions for the emergence of new torts.
We then showed that the notion that there is a residual category of tort
liability had not been borne out in practice. New torts are not illustrations
of the existence of an unnamed, residual category of tort liability for the
simple reason that satisfaction of the preconditions for new torts results in
the torts being named.
The paradox of residual tort liability is that every time a new tort action
is named and comes into being, it can no longer be understood as residual,
even if it once was conceived in that fashion. The preconditions for the
creation of new torts we have set forth, however, do provide a basis for
understanding why the concept of a residual category of tort liability might
seem theoretically attractive. Scholars up through most of the nineteenth
century who denied the existence of such a category insisted that “tort law”
was simply the aggregate of existing causes of action for tortious relief. But
there is something counterintuitive about that formulation because it is
obvious that as tort law has evolved in the United States, something like the
254. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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progressive extension of tort liability to diverse, new situations has
accompanied that evolution. To see that extension of tort liability as only
taking place within existing tort actions does not seem quite accurate, and to
characterize “tort law” as being limited to the aggregate of existing tort causes
of actions at any point in time is a cramped, conclusory view. The concept of
a sphere of residual tort liability existing in a space outside existing tort causes
of action seems theoretically attractive, we believe, because of the
preconditions of social salience and normative weight. And as a practical
matter, the concept is obviously attractive to plaintiffs’ lawyers, who continue
to invoke it. As the examples of potential tort liability for intangible harm we
discussed in Part III illustrate, tort law is never static because new events and
social attitudes toward them generate new perceptions of social wrongs for
which some form of relief should be afforded, and tort law becomes a
candidate to provide that relief. When tort law ends up providing some of
the relief, the basis for that relief amounts to the naming of a new tort.
Accordingly, it does not seem theoretically implausible to think of the relief
as emanating from a sphere of residual tort liability.
But in fact, it does not. It emanates, instead, from all of the
preconditions we have identified. Taken together, those preconditions
amount to formidable barriers to the emergence of new torts, and we have
suggested in Part III that despite the quite clear, contemporary attitudes
that cyber hacking of personal data, publication of that data, and
sexualized misconduct are social wrongs that ideally would require some
form of legal relief; the preconditions of justiciability and practicality
caution against a hasty assumption that relief against those wrongs will
successfully emerge in tort law.
Should some relief for harm from intangible forces and harms largely
of an intangible nature end up being accorded by tort law, however, the
new torts created to redress that harm will not serve to demonstrate the
existence of an unnamed, residual category of tort law. Once the new
torts are created, they will be named, and their naming will serve to
strip them of any residual identity they may have had. In the end, the
future of tortious relief for intangible harm, if it is to take any concrete
form, will be in new torts with names.

